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WITH ALL DUE DEFERENCE:
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS
Hon. ShiraA. Scheindlin* & Matthew L. Schwartz**
"I... do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially dischargeand perform
all the duties incumbent upon me... under the Constitution and laws
of the United States; and that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I
take this obligationfreely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of
the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."
Oath of Officefor United States Judges'

1.
The political branches of our government have a constitutional
mandate to conduct appropriate wars 2 and are well-suited to do so. They
are politically accountable and capable of taking quick action. In
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
Law Clerk, Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin (2002-2004); Columbia College, B.A., 2000;
Columbia Law School, J.D., 2002. The authors wish to thank the participants at the Hofstra Law
School conference entitled Judging Judges Ethics, and in particular Samuel Dash and Ronald
Rotunda, for their helpful comments.
I. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2003); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2003).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12-15; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
*

**
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contrast, the judiciary is by nature deliberative. Most often, judges
consider issues and events in hindsight and are peculiarly insulated from
the vagaries of political accountability by the constitutional grant of life
tenure. Does this mean, however, that courts should abdicate their
traditional role-or that the rule of law is suspended-when the nation is
at war? The answer to this rhetorical question is plainly no. What, then,
is the standard by which a judge should review executive or legislative
actions taken in wartime? This is the question we address in this article.
There are several possible answers, none completely satisfactory.
Courts could find that enforcing constitutional rights trumps every
competing need-even that of effectively fighting a war. This approach
would require courts to conduct an independent non-deferential review
of executive action, regardless of whether that review decreases the
nation's ability to successfully defend itself against its enemies. This
approach has been flatly rejected: "[W]hile the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."3 A second
possible approach is to defer completely to the political branches in
wartime. The problem with this approach is that decisions based on such
deference create precedents that are unacceptable once the threat of war
has receded. The third approach-and the one traditionally adopted by
American courts-is to apply a diminished standard of review to the
constitutionality of wartime policies and actions. But regardless of the
approach taken, the first question in every case is whether the action
taken is truly part of the war effort, or whether "war" is being invoked to
insulate actions that would not otherwise survive judicial review.
Since the declaration of the "War on Terror," there appears to be a
palpable and rising distrust of the judiciary by the political branches, a
distrust that may be exacerbated by a fear that the courts will not tolerate
significant departures from constitutional standards even when actions
that so depart are taken in the name of national defense. This distrust
manifests itself through executive and legislative actions that prevent the
judiciary from fulfilling its mandate to act as a check on the political
branches-by excluding it entirely, drastically curtailing its authority, or
by outright intimidation of judges in the hope of dissuading them from
rejecting initiatives that might not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Historically, courts have shown great deference to decisions of the
political branches in times of war. But the current war is different. It is a
war without borders or duration. We are not fighting a foreign country or
a regular army. In that sense, the line between battlefield hostilities and
3. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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domestic crime is blurred. Because of this difference, courts today have
been less deferential than in the past-at least at the trial level. The
record in the appellate courts has been more mixed, with some panels
reverting to the high level of deference traditionally accorded to military
decisions, while others have applied near plenary review. It remains to
be seen what the high court will do; in a span of eight days in April
2004, the Court heard four cases challenging government actions taken
in furtherance of the War on Terror.
While the tension between guarding constitutional rights and
pursuing military goals exists, we continue to believe that the judiciary
must play its traditional role as the guardian of the Constitution. Neither
knee-jerk rejection of, nor blind deference to, the administration's
policies are acceptable. But a careful balancing of the twin goals of
liberty and security, which may both be achievable, is the judiciary's
role and its mandate. It may not be easy, but a judge's oath requires
nothing less.
Part II of this Article will briefly examine the traditional role of the
judiciary in our tripartite system of government, and the responsibility of
judges to uphold the rule of law as an effective check on the political
branches. Part III recounts the history of the judiciary's war-time
jurisprudence, with a particular emphasis on the Supreme Court's
deferential treatment of the executive's exercise of discretion in military
matters. Part IV surveys the post-September 11 legal landscape, noting
that trial courts have been more receptive to claims that certain actions
of the political branches have endangered fundamental Constitutional
rights, while appellate courts have been more willing to adopt the
deferential attitude displayed in earlier times by the Supreme Court.
Part V will examine certain actions taken by the political branches since
September 11 that reflect, in part, the attitude of those branches towards
the judiciary. In conclusion, we contend that even in war, the judiciary
must be allowed to function as the third, and co-equal, branch of
government envisioned by our founding fathers.
II.
Apart from the Bible, we can think of no document other than the
Constitution that has engendered such a disproportionate ratio of
commentary to text. Nowhere is this ratio more askew than for Article
III of the Constitution, pertaining to the judiciary. Article I, relating to
Congress, consists of 2,386 words that set forth the composition of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, their internal rules and
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procedures, and the limits of those bodies' law-making powers.
Similarly, Article II consists of 1,050 words and sets forth the
qualifications for becoming President, the workings of the Electoral
College, and the powers and responsibilities of the Executive. It also
gives the President the power, after receiving the advice and consent of
the Senate, to appoint federal judges.4
Article III, in contrast, consists of only 388 words divided among
three sections. Section one creates the Supreme Court and empowers
Congress to create inferior courts that it deems necessary. It also
specifies that federal judges shall have life tenure. Section two outlines
the jurisdiction of the Court, and section three defines the crime of
treason. There is no guidance regarding who may sit as a federal judge,
let alone the scope of her powers and duties.
Seizing upon the opportunity to define the limits of its own power,
the Supreme Court early on held that the judiciary is a co-equal branch
of government.5 Simply because the Constitution affords more words to
explaining the legislative and executive authorities makes those branches
no more important; as Montesquieu (the philosophical inspiration for the
United States Constitution) explained, "[t]here would be an end of
everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles
or of the people, to exercise those three powers that, of enacting laws,
that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of
individuals." 6 Unlike the state constitutions of Virginia, 7 Massachusetts, 8
and New Hampshire, 9 and despite the urging of James Madison,' ° the
Constitution contains no specific reference to a separation of powers, nor

2.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
5. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
6. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (Thomas Nugent trans., J.V.
Prichard ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1777).
7. VA.CONST. art. I, § 5.
8. M.G.L.A. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
9. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 37.
10. See generally William C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers
Reconsidered, 35 SYR. L. REv. 715, 720-23 (1984) (describing the debate among the Framers
regarding separation of powers). Indeed, early drafts of the Bill of Rights contained an explicit
separation of powers provision, providing that "[t]he powers delegated in this constitution are
appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative
departments shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judical[,] nor the executive
exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested
in the legislative or executive departments." Fisher, The Efficiency Side of SeparatedPowers, 5 J.
AM. STUD. 113, 130 (1971) (quoted in Banks, supra, at 723, n.44).
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to the equality of the three branches of government. Nonetheless, this
concept is implicit in the structure of the Constitution."
Moreover, the judiciary stands as the final bulwark of the
Constitution, ensuring that the laws enacted by the legislature and
enforced by the executive are permissible exercises of Constitutional
powers:
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must
be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is
consequently to be considered, by this court as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the
further consideration of this subject.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void,
does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them
to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it
constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to
overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at
first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.
It has long been accepted that federal judges, appointed for life
terms, exercise this function of judicial review neutrally, owing
allegiance only to the Constitution and the rule of law. The Constitution
is "the supreme Law of the Land,"' 13 in times of peace and conflict.
The judiciary exists alongside and equal to the political branches,
but also as a check against their powers. Of course, the political branches
act as a check on the judiciary as well, by appointing the members of the
various courts 14and by the power of impeachment, 15by enacting

11.

See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (May 20, 1807), in 10 THE WORKS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (stating "[t]he leading principle of our

Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other"); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 368
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1905) ("[The] principle [of the Constitution] is
that of a separation of Legislative, Executive and Judiciary functions except in cases specified. If
this principle be not expressed in direct terms, it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought
to be so commented and acted on by every friend of free government.").
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
14.

See id.

15.

Seeid. art. I,§ 3, cl.
6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:795

legislation capable of overruling judicial decisions 16 and ultimately by
amending the Constitution. 17 Relevant to our subject matter, the political
branches are vested with the power to wage war and make the decisions
necessary to conduct such wars successfully. 8 The role of the political
branches is to win the war and minimize damage. 19 The legislation,
regulations, and executive orders they issue are the embodiment of that
goal. The judiciary has no role in waging wars. 2 0 But the judiciary's role
is always to protect the Constitution, even (and maybe especially) in
troubled times.
The judiciary thus walks a tight-rope. Judges are trained in the art
of balancing one set of interests against another-both of which are
legitimate. For example, public safety and the rights of the accused have
always been in tension. But the stakes are highest in war time. Judges,
like all who reside here, support the need to safeguard freedom and
defeat those enemies who would threaten it. But judges must balance
these obvious goals with the equally important need to ensure that
Constitutional rights are not diminished in the process. Neither blind
deference nor automatic opposition to the political branches serves this
end. 2'
As one Justice recently explained,
Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges perform a
function fundamentally different from that of the people's elected
representatives. Legislative and executive officials act on behalf of the
voters who placed them in office; judges represent the Law. Unlike
their counterparts in the political branches, judges are expected to
refrain from catering to particular constituencies or committing
themselves on controversial issues in advance of adversarial
presentation. Their mission is to decide individual cases and
16.
17.
18.
19.

Seeid. art. I,§8, cl. 18.
See id. art. V.
See id. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8, 12-15; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
See generally The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-71

(1862); see also id. at 668 (holding that the President has "no power to initiate or declare a war"
absent Congressional authorization, but "[i]f a war be made by invasion ... the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He ... is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority").
20.

See generally U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 727-28 (2d

Cir. 2003) (Wesley, J., dissenting) ("As I read The Prize Cases, it is clear that common sense and
the Constitution allow the Commander in Chief to protect the nation when met with belligerency
and to determine what degree of responsive force is necessary. ... In reaching this conclusion the
Court noted the President's decision regarding the level of force necessary is a political not a
judicial decision.").
21. See generally Jean Bethke Elshtain, Intellectual Dissent and the War on Terror, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, Spr. 2003.
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controversies on individual records, neutrally applying legal principles,
and, when necessary, standing up to what is generally supreme in a
democracy: the popular will.
A judiciary capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to
no person or party, is a longstanding Anglo-American tradition, an
essential bulwark of constitutional government, a constant guardian of
the rule of law. The guarantee of an independent, impartial judiciary
enables society to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. Without this, all the reservations
of particular rights or
22
privileges would amount to nothing.

In times of crisis, history has shown, "majorities and officials" alike
pose a significant threat to the "rights or privileges" guaranteed by the
Constitution. It is precisely in these times that the judiciary must be most
vigilant, lest it permit a diminution of our treasured liberties not easily
undone once the hostilities end. "Our legal system is based on the
principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret
and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the23judiciary is central to
American concepts of justice and the rule of law."
III.
But if "[tlhe ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to
protect the liberty and security of the governed,, 24 then why did one
former Attorney General observe that "[t]he Constitution has not greatly
bothered any wartime President?, 25 Even a cursory review of war-time

22. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803-04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quotation marks, internal citations, and alterations omitted).
23. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble (2000); see also id., Canon I ("An
independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.").
24. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 272 (1991).
25.

FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962). Recalling the decision to impose a

forced evacuation and internment of Japanese-Americans living on the American West Coast during
World War I1,
then-Attorney General Biddle opined,
I do not think [Franklin D. Roosevelt] was much concerned with the gravity of
implications of this step. He was never theoretical about things. What must be done to
defend the country must be done.... The military might be wrong, but they were
fighting the war. Public opinion was on their side, so that there was no question of any
substantial opposition, which might tend toward the disunity that at all costs he must
avoid.... Nor do I think the Constitutional difficulty plagued him. The Constitution has
not greatly bothered any wartime President. That was a question of law, which ultimately
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case law reveals the truth in Attorney General Biddle's observation. It is
no exaggeration to say that whenever America has gone to war (in the
formal sense or otherwise), the courts have been so deferential to the
political branches as to nearly abdicate their traditional role to "support
and defend the Constitution., 26 Where courts have deferred to war-time
goals over constitutional guarantees, the Constitution has been the loser.
The bulwark became a leaky dam.
Although a great many historical and.jurisprudential trends can be
gleaned from these decisions, we are neither historians nor academics.
We wish only to draw attention to the attitudes that have consistently
emerged when the judiciary has been required to evaluate the
constitutionality of war-time measures. The cases discussed below
illustrate the extraordinarily deferential attitude adopted by the courts. In
some cases such deference was appropriate. In others, it was not.
Antebellum America and the Civil War
As early as 1849-twelve years before the secession of South
Carolina and the subsequent civil war-the Supreme Court was called
upon to decide the lawful boundaries of military power within the state
of Rhode Island.2 7 Rhode Island had become fractured over the right to
vote-factions disagreed whether the franchise should be extended to all
male residents, or vested only in male land-owners. 28 The disagreement
became so severe that those in favor of extending the franchise ratified
their own state constitution, elected their own governor, and took up
arms against the incumbent government. 29 The incumbent government,
in turn, recruited the30 state's militia to repel the rebellion and instituted a
state of martial law.
This dispute reached the Supreme Court, via the federal district
court in Providence, when the home of Martin Luther was invaded and
searched by militia forces, ostensibly because Luther was suspected of
giving aid to the rebels.3 1 Obviously, the militia had not procured a
lawful warrant, nor could they point to any exigency that justified their

the Supreme Court must decide. And meanwhile-probably a long meanwhile-we must
get on with the war.
id. at 218-19.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
27. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (I How.) 1 (1849).
28. See id. at 35-36.
29. See id.
30. Seeid. at37.
31. See id.
at 34.
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warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. 32 Rather, it was
claimed that the break-in was justified under martial law. 3 Luther
replied that Article IV of the Constitution, which "guarantee[s] to every
State in th[e] Union
a Republican Form of Government," implicitly
34
law.
martial
forbids
Writing for a divided Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney admitted
that, "[u]nquestionably a military government, established as the
permanent government of the State, would not be a Republican
government, and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it." 35 But
Taney went on to hold that the martial law imposed in Rhode Island was
not a permanent government, but rather a temporary state of affairs
while the rightful government was determined.3 6 That being so, Taney
held that the courts were ill-equipped to intervene in the political
struggle, and the Court went on to suggest that the rule of law might
have no place in Rhode Island until the hostilities ceased: "Could the
court, while the parties were actually contending in arms for possession
of the government, call witnesses before it and inquire which party
represented a majority of people? ...The ordinary course of
37
proceedings in courts of justice would be utterly unfit for the crisis."
By this decision, the Court had unmistakably signaled that its role was
plainly and substantially diminished in times of war.
During the Civil War, Lincoln famously suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, thereby allowing American citizens to be arrested by the
military without recourse to the judiciary.38 Interestingly, it was Chief
Justice Taney-sitting as Circuit Justice for Maryland in Ex parte
Merryman39 -who held that Lincoln was overreaching, and that it was
"one of those points of constitutional law upon which there was no

32. See id.
33. See id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
35. Luther, 48 U.S. at 45.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 43-44. Not all members of the Court shared Chief Justice Taney's view that the rule
of law could be supplanted in times of war. Justice Levi Woodbury wrote that under martial law,
"every citizen, instead of reposing under the shield of known and fixed laws as to his liberty,
property, and life, exists with a rope around his neck, subject to be hung up by a military despot at
the next lamp-post, under the sentence of some drum-head court-martial." Id. at 62 (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting).
38. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 237 (Library of America 1989) (granting
permission to suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
39. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). The Merryman decision was never
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
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difference of opinion" 40 that the Constitution specifically reserves the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to Congress. 41 The
suspension of the writ without congressional authorization, Taney wrote,
offended the Constitution and did violence to a system of checks and
balances:
With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too
clear to be misunderstood by any one [sic], I can see no ground
whatever for supposing that the president, in any emergency, or in any
state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the
judicial power. He certainly does not faithfully execute the laws, if he
takes upon himself legislative power, by suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, and the judicial power also, by arresting and imprisoning a
person without due process of law.42
Although the court issued the writ, in a true show of presidential
hubris Lincoln simply ignored the decision, keeping Merryman detained
in Fort McHenry until he was subsequently indicted for conspiracy to
commit treason.4 3
In 1866-more than a year after Robert E. Lee surrendered to
Ulysses Grant at the Appomattox Courthouse-the Supreme Court
decided a related question: whether civilians could be tried and
sentenced in military tribunals. In Ex Parte Milligan,44 the Court held
that they could not.
Milligan was a Southern sympathizer living in Indiana who was
accused of participating in a secret organization that conspired to disrupt
the Union war effort, most notably by releasing prisoners of war from an
Indiana prison and by opposing the draft.45 Although a civilian, Milligan
was arrested by military officials, tried before a military tribunal,
convicted, and sentenced to death.46 His petition for a writ of habeas
corpus eventually reached the Supreme Court.4 7

40. Id. at 148.
41.

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
42.
43.

Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149.
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 38-

39 (1998). Merryman was ultimately released on bail, and was never tried. See id. at 39. But,
surprisingly, "there was no extended public criticism of the administration's disregard of the

decision," even before Merryman was released. Id. at 45.
44.
45.
46.
47.

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
See id. at 6-7.
See id.
See id. at 8.
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Although the Court unanimously held that the government had no
authority to try Milligan in a military tribunal-and thus that the writ
should issue 48-there was stark disagreement as to the basis for this
holding. Justice David Davis, writing for a five-member majority,
adopted a sweeping rights-based rationale, holding that the use of
military tribunals to try civilians during times when the civilian courts
are open amounts to a violation of due process:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false .... 49
But the remaining four justices signed onto a concurrence, authored
by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, a Lincoln appointee, that rejected the
majority's reasoning in favor of a separation of powers approach.50 The
reason why Milligan could not be tried by military tribunal, Chase
wrote, was not that the Constitution forbade it, but rather-harkening
back to Chief Justice Taney's decision in Merryman-that Milligan
51
could not be tried by military tribunal on the president's say-so alone.
Rather, only Congress could authorize the use of military tribunals. 2
Whatever force the majority's decision in Milligan had was shortlived, for in 1868 the Court decided Ex parte McCardle, which
presented substantially the same question as Milligan. By this time, the
war had been over for three years. Chief Justice Chase delivered a short
opinion on behalf of a now-unanimous court dismissing McCardle's
petition because, after Milligan was decided, Congress had divested the
judiciary of jurisdiction over such cases. 4 Even though McCardle had
made his petition under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, 55 Congress
repealed the 1867 Act after the Court had heard arguments on his

48.

See id. at 107.

49. Id. at 120-21.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. 132-42.
Seeid. at132-34.
See id. at 137, 140.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506(1868).
Seeid. at514-15.
14 Stat. 385 (1867).
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petition.56 While it was obvious that Congress repealed the provision
specifically to deprive McCardle of the opportunity to gain release from
military custody, the Court upheld the Repeal Act and found it lacked
jurisdiction to hear McCardle's appeal.57
There is no question that the separation of powers approach urged
by the concurrence in Milligan had by then prevailed over the majority's
rights-based view, for if trial of civilians in military tribunals truly ran
afoul of due process, nothing Congress did could remedy that fact.
Although some commentators have claimed that the core holding of
Milligan-that it is unconstitutional, regardless of congressional
authorization, to try civilians in military tribunals when the civilian
courts are open-remains undisturbed, 58 most scholars now recognize
that "the real legacy of ExparteMilligan is confined between the covers
of constitutional history books. The decision itself has had little effect on
history." 59 Moreover, McCardle exemplified a strange view of
separation of powers-the judiciary's role was essentially eliminated.6 °
56. 15 Stat. 44 (1868). Congress passed the Repeal Act over President Johnson's veto.
Explaining his veto, Johnson said,
I cannot give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive any person
"restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution ... ," the right of appeal
to the highest judicial authority known to our Government....
...[The Supreme Court] combines judicial wisdom and impartiality in a greater
degree than any authority known to the Constitution; and any act which may be
construed into or mistaken for an attempt to prevent or evade its decision on a question
which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country cannot fail to be attended
with unpropitious consequences.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (1868).
57. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
58. See, e.g., Arthur N. Eisenberg, Wilson's Wisdom, in IT'S A FREE COUNTRY: PERSONAL
FREEDOM IN AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 255-64 (Danny Goldberg et al. eds., 2002).
59. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

184 (1991).
60. During the war, the Court had determined that it had no authority to review the
determinations of military tribunals by way of appeal. See ExparteVallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
243, 253 (1864). Between Vallandigham and McCardle, a prisoner could neither appeal the decision
of a military tribunal, nor could he question the validity of his trial. However, the Court in
McCardle did suggest that there might be another, unspecified, way for a prisoner to seek redress.
See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515 ("Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the
repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is
denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases by
appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was
previously exercised.").
Two years prior to McCardle, the Court similarly declined to evaluate the constitutionality
of certain provisions of the Reconstruction Acts, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428; Act of
Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), Chief
Justice Chase, writing for a unanimous Court, held that there can be no "judicial interference with
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The Great War
When America entered World War I, the authority of the political
branches to abandon constitutional protections was barely challenged.
"World War I ...created some of the most egregious violations of civil
liberties in our history." 61 It was also during World War I that the
government sought, in a widespread and systematic way, to imprison
those Americans that opposed the war effort in word, rather than in deed.
The Sedition Act of 1918 made it a criminal offense to use "any
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or
Navy," or any language that might bring those institutions "into
contempt, scorn,.., or disrepute. ,,62 A frequent target of prosecutors
under the Sedition Act was the Socialist party and its members.
When the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act-only three months before the Germans surrendered at
Versailles-the justices unanimously upheld it. In the Court's first
63
significant foray into First Amendment law, Schenck v. United States,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes memorably wrote,
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.... The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured

the exercise of Executive discretion" when the executive acts pursuant to congressional mandate. Id.
at 499.
61. Alan Brinkley, A FamiliarStory: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in THE WAR
ON OuR FREEDOMS 26 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). Much of the background
concerning World War I was drawn from Professor Brinkley's essay.
62. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). A precursor to this Act was the Sedition
Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), which had made it a crime to "write, print, utter or
publish... any false, scandalous, and malicious" statements against the government. The 1798 Act
was designed to stifle criticism of the fledgling country's increasing movement toward a war with
France. The Federalists in Congress created the law, which expired under its own terms in 1801, as
"a temporary defense measure necessary for protecting the nation from disloyal citizens who would
aid and abet the enemy through writing and speaking." JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS
FREEDOM 37 (1999). Thus, the courts never had the opportunity to pass on this first effort to
criminalize criticism of the government.
63. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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so long as men fight and that
64 no Court could regardthem as protected
by any constitutionalright.
Using this rationale, the Court affirmed the convictions of a
Socialist party official who distributed flyers opposing the draft
(admittedly by "peaceful measures such as petition for repeal of the
[draft] act"), 65 and of Socialist party leader Eugene V. Debs for giving a
speech opposing the draft and questioning America's involvement in the
war.

66

Subsequently, Justice Holmes changed course and became a strong
67
voice for First Amendment freedoms. In Abrams v. United States,
decided shortly after the end of World War I, Holmes-without
conceding that his prior opinions were wrongly decided-wrote that:
Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the
country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a
silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success
of the
68
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.
The only discemable difference between Abrams and Schenck was
the prominence of the leaflet's author and the number of copies in
circulation, yet Holmes reached opposite conclusions. Little explanation
was given for this change of heart, although it may simply reflect the
natural evolution of Holmes's views towards rights not previously
examined; prior to this line of cases, the Court had not
emphasized the
69
protections of the Bill of Rights qua individual rights.
Nonetheless, Holmes remained in the minority (often with Justice
Louis Brandeis) in a number of World War I-era free speech cases, as
the majority continued to evaluate laws curtailing civil liberties by a
different standard during times of war. 70 Moreover, the administration
64. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 51.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Brinkley, supra note 61, at 35-37.

70. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 254 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In these opinions and others, Justices Holmes
and Brandeis repeatedly set out the argument for a liberal reading of the First Amendment and a

robust freedom of speech:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new
legislation and new institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument
to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law-
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was not content with merely imprisoning those alleged subversives
whose speech constituted a "clear and present danger" to the war effort.
Under the Espionage Act,71 among other things, mailing privileges were
withheld from publications that contained "seditious" material;
"seditious" material, in turn, arguably included any writing that tended
to question the war effort or America's involvement in the war. 72 The
task of determining whether a publication contained "seditious" material
ultimately fell to Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson,
a task that Burleson approached with great relish, announcing that
"seditious" materials included anything that might "impugn the
motives of the government and thus encourage insubordination";
anything that suggested "that the government is controlled by Wall
Street or munitions manufacturers, or any other special interests";
anything, in other words, that Burleson considered somehow radical.
73
All publications of the Socialist party were banned by definition.
Still, when these provisions of the Espionage Act came under
judicial scrutiny, they were summarily affirmed on the rationale of
Schenck.74 Any suggestion that the government was acting at the behest
of special interests was viewed as an unacceptable "hindrance" to the
war effort.
World War II
The Second World War also left a legacy of discarded rights. Early
in the war, the Court underscored the fact that Milligan was a dead letter.
In Ex parte Quirin, 75 the Court considered whether eight German
saboteurs could lawfully be tried in closed military tribunals,
notwithstanding the fact that the civilian courts were open, and that at

merely, because the argument presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be
unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning
or intemperate in language.
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273.
71. Ch.30,4OStat.217(1917).
72. See id. tit. XII, §§ 1, 2; Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75,40 Stat. 553 (1918) (adding to the list
of the Espionage Act's already proscribed conduct the "print[ing], writ[ing], or publi[cation of] any
disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about the form of government of the United States,
or the Constitution of the United States, ... or any language intended to bring the form of
government of the United States or the Constitution ... into contempt, scorn, contumely, or

disrepute").
73. See Brinkley, supra note 61, at 26-27.
74. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407, 409-10, 414-15 (1921).
75. 317 U.S. 1(1942).
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least one of the saboteurs asserted that he was an American citizen.76
President Roosevelt had determined that the saboteurs were "unlawful
combatants," who should be tried in military tribunals. The Court
affirmed the President's determination (although it declined to adopt the
government's argument that the courts were without power to review it),
and also approved of many essential features of military tribunals,
including eliminating the safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments-even where American citizens are concerned.7 8 Although
the Quirin Court did not overrule Milligan, it created a broad exception
to Milligan's prohibition on military tribunals. By distinguishing
Milligan on the narrow basis that Milligan was a non-combatant, the
Court held that unlawful belligerents could be tried in military
tribunals. 79 It was no longer the case that "[t]he Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace. 8 °
That principle was reinforced one year later, when the Court
considered the constitutionality of a military regulation that imposed an
8:00 p.m. curfew on all Americans of Japanese ancestry. 81 Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, writing for the majority in Hirabayashi v. United
States, held that "[t]he war power of the national government is the
power to wage war successfully., 82 In effect, Hirabayashi held that
when a decision of the political branches involves military imperatives, a
court may not review it-even when the decision openly and obviously
eliminates a right guaranteed to the people by the Constitution.
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of
warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the
threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for
resisting it. Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise
of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 20, 23-24.
See id. at 22-23.
See id. at 39-40.
See id. at 45.
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943).
Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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of
responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review
83
the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.
Nor was the Court concerned about the claim that such a measure
discriminated on the basis of national origin. Although the Court
acknowledged that such classifications "are by their very nature odious
to a free people, 84 it stressed that the curfew in question was not based
solely on national origin: "The fact alone that attack on our shores was
threatened by Japan rather than another enemy power set these citizens
' 85
apart from others who have no particular associations with Japan."
That fact that there was no evidence that Hirabayashi himself was
disloyal to the United States or posed any threat was not even
considered.
The following year, in Korematsu v. United States, 86 the Court
affirmed the conviction of a Japanese-American citizen who had
remained at his home in San Leandro, California, after the military had
ordered that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated from
the West Coast and sent to internment camps. 87 Once again, the Court
overlooked questions of race discrimination and racial profiling and the
absence of any particularized suspicion that Korematsu was disloyal.
Justice Hugo Black wrote:
We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did
not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could
not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a
that
menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded
88
prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.

83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 100.
85.

Id. at 101.

86. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
87. See id. at215.
88. Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)). Korematsu,
unlike Hirabyashi, did provoke impassioned dissent from some justices. See, e.g., id. at 226
(Roberts, J., dissenting) ("[This] is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the
United States. If this be a correct statement of the facts disclosed by this record, and facts of which
we take judicial notice, I need hardly labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been
violated."). And indeed, fifty years after the fact, Congress issued a formal apology to all JapaneseAmericans, recognizing that the motivation for internment was "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria,
and a failure of political leadership." 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000).
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Justice Robert Jackson, dissenting, went one step further:
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of
intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence,
but are made on information that often would not be admissible and on
assumptions that could not be proved. ... Hence courts can never have
any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authorities
that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military
viewpoint. 89
Yet in an opinion issued the same day as Korematsu, the Court did
grant a writ of habeas corpus to a Japanese-American woman who had
submitted to the forced internment, but then pleaded her loyalty to the
United States. 90 The technical basis for the Court's holding was that the
applicable act of Congress and presidential order only required
Japanese-Americans to be evacuated from the West Coast military zone;
9
they did not require incarceration after evacuation. '
It is worth noting that by this time the outcome of the war was not
seriously in doubt,92 so the Court's perceived need to defer completely to
the political branches on matters concerning the war effort may have
waned. While the Court was not willing to invalidate the internment
altogether, it was willing to release individuals whose loyalty was
unquestioned.
Certainly the Court was more cognizant of civil liberties concerns
after the war concluded than it was when the outcome was still in

89. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
90. SeeExparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294, 297 (1944).
91. See id. at 300-01. The Court's result in Endo has been rightly criticized in the light of
Hirabayashiand Korematsu:
There is a certain disingenuousness in this sequence of three opinionsHirobayashi, Korenatsu, and Endo. There was no reason to think that Gordon
Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu were any less loyal to the United States than was
Mitsuye Endo. Presumably they would have been entitled to relief from detention upon
the same showing as that made by Endo. But even had Hirabayashi tried to raise that
question in his case, he would not have been successful. The Court confined itself to the
issue of the curfew, not the requirement to report to the relocation center. It also appears
that a majority of the Court at the time of the Hirabayashidecision in June 1943 was
unwilling to say that one detained in a relocation center would be entitled to release upon
a finding of loyalty. It was not until a year and a half later that the Court came around to
this view in Endo, when the United States' fortunes of war were vastly improved. The
traditional unwillingness of courts to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily also
illustrates in a rough way the Latin maxim Inter arma silent leges: In time of war the
laws are silent.
REHNQUIST, supranote 43, at 202.
92. See REHNQUIST, supra note 43, at 202.
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doubt. 93 But even years after the fighting had ended, the Court
retroactively approved of virtually unfettered executive authority during
wartime. For example, in upholding the Alien Act,94 which permitted the
summary arrest and detention of resident aliens who were "citizens,
denizens, or subjects of [a] hostile nation" 95-i.e., anyone, not
naturalized, of the same nationality as America's enemies-Justice
Jackson wrote:
Executive power over enemy aliens, [96] undelayed and unhampered by
litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime security. This is in keeping with the practice of the most
enlightened of nations and has resulted in treatment of alien enemies
more considerate than that which has prevailed among any of our
enemies and some of our allies. This statute was enacted or suffered to
continue by men who helped found the Republic and formulate the Bill
of Rights, and although it obviously denies enemy aliens the
constitutional immunities of citizens, it seems not then to have been
supposed that a nation's obligations to its foes could ever be put on a
parity with those to its defenders.
The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary
97
arrest, internment and deportation whenever a "declared war" exists.
Recent History
Judicial deference to the political branches during hostilities has
continued over the last half-century. During the Korean War, the Court
reversed a judgment under the Federal Tort Claims Act9" in favor of the
93. See, e'g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (granting writ of habeas corpus to
two prisoners tried before military tribunals in Hawaii during the war; because their offenses were
not related to the war and because the civilian courts were open, the Court held that they should not
have been tried by a military tribunal).
94. Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577 (1798). The Act was allowed to expire in 1801.

95. Id. § 1.
96. "In the primary meaning of the words, an alien friend is the subject of a foreign state at
peace with the United States; an alien enemy is the subject of a foreign state at war with the United
States." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950) (quoting Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E.
185, 186 (N.Y. 1920)). Thus, at the time of World War II, any Japanese citizen could have been
considered an "enemy alien."
97. Id. at 774-75; see also United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)
(upholding the constitutionality of the War Brides Act, permitting the government to exclude,
without hearing and solely upon a finding of the Attorney General that her admission would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably
in the armed forces).
98. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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families of air force personnel killed during a test flight. " The
government had violated an order of the trial court by withholding a
report about the cause of the crash. 10 0 But the Supreme Court held that
unless plaintiffs could make a showing of necessity, an unsupported
invocation of a national defense privilege would prevail. 1°1 And "even
the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if
the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake."' 1 2 The
Court even agreed to accept the claim of privilege without actually
reviewing the allegedly privileged material. 103 And recalling the
Espionage and Sedition Acts of the First World War, the Court upheld
the Smith Act during the "red scare" of the 1950s, essentially
criminalizing membership or participation in the Communist party.I°4
As recently as the Cold War, the Court displayed its willingness to
defer to executive judgment, especially where the executive acted
pursuant to congressional authorization. The Court, for example, upheld
the power of President Carter to use so-called "blocking orders" against
foreign assets as part of his arsenal in negotiating the resolution of the
Iranian hostage crisis. 105 The Court, citing Justice Jackson's
"authoritative"' 1 6 concurrence in The Steel Seizure Cases,'°7 held:

99. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
100. Seeid. at4-5.
101. Seeid. at lO-1l.
102. ld. at 11.
103. See id. at 8, 10 ("Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force
disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect .... "). Fifty years later, when the report
was declassified, the surviving plaintiffs learned that not only did it contain no military secrets, the
report explicitly assigned fault in the crash to the government. See Petition for Writ of Error Coram
Nobis, In re Patricia J. Herring, No. 02M76 (2002). The Court refused to re-open the case. See
Order, In re Patricia J. Herring, 123 S. Ct. 2633 (2003). The plaintiffs have now initiated new
litigation in United States District Court, alleging that the Justice Department effectively defrauded
them out of their rightful damages by deceiving the court. See Matt Katz, Historic Case Gets New
Hearing,
PHILA.
COURIER-POST,
May
12,
2004,
available
at
http://www.southjerseynews.com/issues/may/m05I204a.htm.
104. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).
105. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-89 (1981).
106. REHNQUIST, supra note 43, at 219.
107. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an expressed or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it
may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these
circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.").
The Court in The Steel Seizure Cases held that President Truman had exceeded his constitutional
authority when he seized the nation's steel mills to divert their resources towards the war effort in
Korea. See id. at 587-89.
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Because the President's action in nullifying the attachments and
ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific
congressional authorization, it is supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the
burden
of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack
°
it.i.108

In short, the Court presumed that the President's actions were
constitutional.
Deference and Its Consequences
The Court has applied a diminished standard of constitutional
scrutiny to so-called military decisions, eschewing the task of weighing
rights and constitutional guarantees against claims of military necessity.
Where the political branches have acted pursuant to lawful authority,the
Court has generally deferred to the judgment of those powers, rather
than reviewing those actions through a constitutional lens.
The Court's decisions are no doubt defensible. The arguments
advanced in Luther and Hirabayashi, for example, have considerable
merit: military decisions are often made quickly, out of necessity, and
the decisionmakers' first concern is not-and should not be-the
Constitution. The power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully, and the political branches of government are rightly given
wide latitude in making military determinations. A court, reviewing the
decision months or years later, with the time to study written
submissions, question the litigants, and pore over precedents-and
judging whether the decision comports with constitutional standardsmay decide the action was inappropriate. But for a truly military
decision, such extended review may be impractical, if not dangerous.
Thus, deference is warranted.
On the other hand, as we shall see in Part IV, many issues brought
to the courts, albeit during war time, are not truly military. The danger
lies in the government's blanket or naked assertions of military necessity
and in its insistence that the courts play no role whatsoever in reviewing
government actions taken in war time.
For the separation of powers to be meaningful, the judicial branch
must always remain co-equal with the executive and legislative
branches. During times of war, courts may properly apply a standard of
heightened deference when reviewing the conduct of the political

108. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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branches, but they -must never abdicate their responsibility to conduct
that review in the first place.10 9
IV.
If courts were less vigilant in protecting constitutional rights during
prior wars than they should have been, the judicial response to postSeptember 11 measures has been heartening. We offer several reasons
for this phenomenon.
First,we live in an era that places a very high value on individual
rights: the right to free speech, the right to bear arms, and the right to
privacy to name a few. Those rights have been well developed by legal
precedent and loom large as fundamental rights afforded to all
Americans. During previous wars, by contrast, the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights were less ingrained in our collective consciousness.
Second, and relatedly, civil rights organization are considerably
more organized now than they were during prior wars. Organizations
such as the American Civil Liberties Union, founded in 1920, have
insured that many aspects of the measures taken by Congress and the
President are challenged in the courts." 10
Third, because this war poses unique security risks at home, the
scope of executive and legislative action has been very broad. Antiterror measures strongly implicate our most basic rights and raise
substantial questions under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
Fourth, many of the administration's actions, particularly those in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, were taken with one-and only
one-goal in mind: to prevent another attack."l' That was the mandate
109. Seizing on this notion, Justice Jackson wrote in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), the War Brides Case:
Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to the United States, but
he will not be told why. He must abandon his bride to live in his own country or forsake
his country to live with his bride.
So he went to court and sought a writ of habeas corpus, which we never tire of
citing to Europe as the unanswerable evidence that our free country permits no arbitrary
official detention. And the Government tells the Court that not even a court can find out
why the girl is excluded. But it says we mustfind that Congress authorizedthis treatment
of war brides and, even if we cannot get any reasonsfor it, we must say it is legal;
security requires it.
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name.
Id. at 550-51 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
110. See generally ACLU, ABOUT THE ACLU, at http://www.aclu.org/about/aboutmain.cfm.
S11. As the government asserted in a recent argument to the Supreme Court, "[w]hen the
Commander in Chief has dispatched the armed forces to repel a foreign attack on this country, the
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given to the Attorney General by the President."l 2 Department of Justice
officials have themselves admitted that their actions in those first days
and weeks were severe and, in hindsight, perhaps hasty)'13
To their credit, the trial courts have not routinely deferred to the
administration's policies in this most recent war. Many courts have held
that the administration's actions do not pass constitutional muster, and
those that have held otherwise have subjected those actions to serious
constitutional scrutiny. The appellate court decisions have been more
divided, with some courts opting to revert to the blind deference that
characterized the judicial response in prior conflicts. After reviewing the
case law, we offer some possible explanations for this trend.
The FirstAmendment
The First Amendment appears to have sustained the least damage or
threat of damage from the response to September 11.114 Unlike during
the Great War, there have been no serious attempts to silence critics of
military's duty is to subdue the enemy and not prepare to defend its judgments in a federal
courtroom." Respondent's Brief at 49, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
112. See, e.g., Wayne Washington & Mary Leonard, America Prepares Shaping
Strategy/ProposedLegislation. US Seeks New Power to Track, Detain, Deport, Boston Globe, Sept.
20, 2001, at A31.
113. Kenneth Karas, co-chief of the organized crime and terrorism unit of the Southern District
of New York United States Attorney's office, recently explained that:
"[I]n those early days, a lot of the material witness warrants and a lot of what was being
done was driven by a real concern that the next big one was around the corner. ... In
hindsight, some people might be critical, but at the time we had no idea what was going
to happen."
Siobhan Roth, Band of Brothers,LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 11. Karas was to be nominated to
the bench of the Southern District of New York in September 2003, and as of this writing, his
nomination remains on the Senate floor. See Press Release, Schumer, White House, Pataki Reach
Agreement on Filling All Vacancies on New York's Federal Bench (July 22, 2003), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PR01883.pfhtml;
Judicial
Nominations
for
the
108th
Congress,
at
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/nominations/cover040l04c.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2004).
An egregious example of this prosecutorial haste is the case of Abdallah Higazy, an
Egyptian student studying in America. Prosecutors suspected Higazy of owning a special pilot's
radio-which they thought could have been used to coordinate the attacks-that was left in a hotel
room near the World Trade Center. Higazy was detained as a material witness and eventually
confessed to owning the radio after thirty days in custody. As it turned out, the radio actually
belonged to a pilot who had stayed in the same hotel. Higazy claims that threats from government
agents against him and his family caused him to make the false confession. See Patricia Hurtado,
Suspect FreedAfter Aviation Radio Mystery Near WTC, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 2002.
114. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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the administration. This undoubtedly accords with a philosophical shift
in American values-we simply would not tolerate such censorship of
individuals. 15 Freedom of the press, however, is regarded much more
coolly than is freedom of speech.'1 6 Thus, many of the government's
policies have been aimed at the media, usually by foreclosing press
access to proceedings involving any possible connection
to terrorism and
7
otherwise withholding information from the public.' 1
One such policy, ordered by the Attorney General and implemented
by Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, 1 8 was the closing of all
immigration proceedings designated "special interest" cases. Under the
Attorney General's order, not only are the hearings themselves closed to
the public, the press, and members of the immigrant's family, but public
access to the docket itself is restricted. 19 Court personnel are enjoined
from confirming or denying whether a case is on the docket or scheduled
for a hearing. 120 Under the order, the Attorney General does not need to
disclose his reasons for designating certain cases "special interest" cases,
nor is any provision made for review of such a determination. 121
Hundreds of immigration proceedings have been closed pursuant to this
22

order. 1

In a pair of cases filed in early 2002, a consortium of media groups
challenged the closed immigration hearings and demanded access. In
115. In a recent survey of one thousand Americans, only thirty-one percent disagreed with the
statement that "[i]ndividuals should be allowed to protest in public against American's involvement
in war during a period of active military combat." See CENTER FOR SURVEY RESEARCH &
ANALYSIS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2003 31

(2003) [hereinafter STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2003]. And more generally, ninety-five
percent of Americans agreed that "[p]eople should be allowed to express unpopular opinions." Id. at
25. But see United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
affd 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to enjoin New York City from denying a permit to antiwar protesters who wanted to hold a demonstration against the war in Iraq).
116. Forty-three percent of Americans agreed that the media has too much freedom to publish
what it wants, and forty-four percent disagreed with the statement, "Newspapers should be allowed
to freely criticize the U.S. military about its strategy and performance." STATE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 2003, supra note 115, at 28.
117. See generally John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS, supra note 61, at 220-36.
118. The Attorney General's directive was disseminated in an e-mail from Chief Judge Creppy
to all Immigration Judges sent just ten days after the terrorist attacks, and attached instructions for
dealing with such so-called "special interest" cases. See Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief
Immigration Judge, to All Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), at
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Cf N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2002).
122. See Edward Walsh, High Court Stays Out of Secrecy Fray,WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at
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Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 123 Judge Nancy G. Edmunds in the
Eastern District of Michigan enjoined the hearings' closure, holding that
the media has a right of access to the immigration proceedings. 24 In a
to-the-point opinion, Judge Edmunds dismissed the government's
rationale for closing the hearings, "even under the most deferential
standard of review."' 1 5 "Although the structure of the Government's
argument is built on statutory interpretation, jurisdiction, and
administrative procedures," she wrote, "the subtext is all about the
Government's right to suspend certain personal liberties in the pursuit of
' 126
national security.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge Edmunds, holding that
"[d]emocracies die behind closed doors."'1 27 More importantly, that court
rejected a deferential standard of review, emphasizing that government
action that curtails a First Amendment right of access is subject to "strict
scrutiny," and must be supported by a showing that denial "'is
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
128
tailored to serve that interest.""
But the court did leave the door slightly ajar. It held that
safeguarding the government's investigation of the September 11
terrorist attack and other terrorist conspiracies did constitute a
compelling interest. The court also held, however, that the real fault in
the Creppy directive was that it was not narrowly tailored in that there
was no requirement for individualized determinations. 129 It was not
enough that the Department of Justice had made that case-by-case
determination itself:
Assuming such an evaluation has occurred, we find that problems still
remain. The task of designating a case special interest is performed in
secret, without any established standards or procedures, and the
process is, thus, not subject to any sort of review, either by another
administrative entity or the 1courts.
Therefore, no real safeguard on the
30
exercise of authority exists.

123. 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
124. See id. at 940; see also Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 (E.D. Mich. 2002),
vacated as moot, 76 Fed. Appx. 672 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
125.

Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. at 947.

126. Id. at 940.
127. DetroitFree Press, 303 F.3d 683.
128. Id. at 705 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07
(1982)).
129.
130.

See id.
Id. at 710.
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If the special interest designation was made in the light of day,
subject to effective review, then some immigration hearings could be
closed. 131 But the court would not deny the media access on the
government's say-so alone.
Similarly, in North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,132 Chief Judge
John W. Bissell of the District of New Jersey also granted injunctive
relief to the media. 133 But when the case was appealed to the Third
Circuit-after the Sixth Circuit had ruled in Detroit Free Press-a
divided panel reversed. 134 That court found, largely on the basis of
historical analysis, that there is no media right of access to immigration
proceedings, and thus the presumption of open hearings was very
weak. 135 Accordingly, rather than adopting the "strict scrutiny" test
required by Detroit Free Press, only the most deferential standard of
review would be applied:
Our judgment is confined to the extremely narrow class of deportation
cases that are determined by the Attorney General to present
significant national security concerns. In recognition [of] his
experience (and our lack of experience) in this field, we will defer to
his judgment. We note that although there may be no judicial remedy
the powerful check of political
for these closures, there is, as always,136
accountability on Executive discretion.
The judiciary, in other words, had no say in the matter. Despite the
Supreme Court has
split between the Third and Sixth circuits, the
1 37
declined to hear any appeal from these decisions.
The government has also moved to severely limit access to
information under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 138 an act
that supplements the First Amendment by creating a statutory right for
Americans to know "what their Government is up to.' ' 13 9 But in Center
131. Indeed, Judge Edmunds subsequently affirmed the limited closure of the immigration
hearings that were the subject of the Detroit FreePress litigation in order to safeguard the source of
the government's information. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcrofl, Nos. 02-70339, 02-70605, 2002
WL 31317398 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2002).

132. 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123

S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
133. Seeid. at305.
134. See generally N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
135. Seeid. at201.
136.
137.
138.
2003)).
139.
749, 773

Id. at 220.
See generally N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp.
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
(1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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for National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice,
the Justice Department refused to answer a FOIA request seeking the
identities of individuals detained in connection with the September 11
investigation. 14 The trial court refused to credit the government's
invocation of an exception permitting it to withhold information
compiled for law enforcement purposes that142it claimed would endanger
the investigation or the safety of any person.
But the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court
had failed to sufficiently defer to the executive. 143 In an opinion echoing
North Jersey Media Group, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit held:
It is abundantly clear that the government's top counterterrorism
officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment [of the harm
that will result from disclosure]. Conversely, the judiciary is in an
extremely poor position to second-guess the executive's judgment in
this area of national security. We therefore reject any attempt to
artificially limit the long-recognized deference to the executive on
national security issues .... It is within the role of the executive to
acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It is
not within the role of courts to second-guess 144executive judgments
made in furtherance of that branch's proper role.
As forcefully noted in the dissent, the majority's approach
"drastically diminishes, if not eliminates, the judiciary's
role in FOIA
45
cases that implicate national-security interests."'
140. 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
141. See id. at 98. After the September 11 attacks, the Department of Justice changed its policy
with respect to responding to FOIA requests. Previously, information would be released unless it
was reasonably foreseeable that disclosure would be harmful. Now, government agencies may
oppose FOIA requests "whenever there is a legal basis to do so." Eric J. Sinrod, The Intersection
Between Information and Security, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2003.
142. In support of this proposition, the government submitted the identical affidavit that had
been found lacking in DetroitFree Press.See Cr.for Nat 'lSec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
143. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
144. Id. at 928, 932 (citations omitted). In an impassioned dissent, Judge David Tatel attacked
the majority's deferential posture:
While the government's reasons for withholding some of the information may well be
legitimate, the court's uncritical deference to the government's vague, poorly explained
arguments for withholding broad categories of information about the detainees, as well
as its willingness to fill in the factual and logical gaps in the government's case,
eviscerates both FOIA itself and the principles of openness in government that FOIA
embodies.
Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 951 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Courts have also gone out of their way to avoid "right to
know" issues in the wake of September 11.See, e.g., Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 276 F.
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The FourthAmendment
It is virtually impossible for a court to entirely abandon its Fourth
Amendment obligation to determine whether probable cause exists for
the issuance of a warrant and whether a search or seizure is
reasonable. 146 Rather than challenging the judiciary's duty to
independently examine the probable cause requirement, the Fourth
Amendment cases have raised concerns that the warrant requirement has
been eviscerated.
One of the first aspects of the government's anti-terror policies to
come under judicial scrutiny was the use of material witness warrants to
detain individuals who might have information helpful to the
government's investigation. 147 Unlike the original use of material
witness warrants-to guarantee the attendance of a witness at trial,
thereby ensuring a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process and to confront adverse witnesses 148-the government began
using material witness warrants shortly after September 11 to detain
potential witnesses. 149 In order for a material witness warrant to issue,
the government need only satisfy a judge that
the witness has
1 50
information that is material to a criminal proceeding.
It is easy to see how this practice implicates Fourth Amendment
concerns: Are these seizures "reasonable?" Because the witness is not
being held for trial, but rather as part of an ongoing (and potentially
interminable) investigation, there is no fixed term of detention. There is
no trial with a date certain; the detainee can be called and recalled before
the grand jury over a period of months, or longer. Moreover, there is no
countervailing Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant. In
addition, the material witnesses were held as if they were criminals-in
Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003) (declining to consider whether to release Federal Aviation Administration

directive that allegedly requires airline personnel to search all Arab passengers before permitting
them to board).
146. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

147. Material witness warrants are authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2003).
148. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Scheindlin, J.),
rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention
and Intimidation: The History and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483,485
(2002).
149. See Studnicki & Apol, supranote 148, at 485-86.
150. See id. at 494-95.
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maximum security facilities under lock-down twenty-three hours a day,
subject to strip searches, continuous lighting, constant surveillance,
subjected to polygraph tests and persistent interrogations, all without
access to counsel or family.' 51
Although three district courts have split on the subject, 152 a panel of
the Second Circuit unanimously upheld the constitutionality of this use
of material witness warrants. 153 Importantly, the court engaged in a
thorough and searching analysis of the practice, balancing the material
witness' Fourth Amendment rights against the government's interest in
conducting a grand jury generally, and, in particular, "the indictment and
successful prosecution of terrorists whose attack, if committed by a
sovereign, would have been tantamount to war, and the discovery of the
conspirators' means, contacts, and operations in order to forestall future
attacks."' 154 Having conducted this balancing, the court concluded that
the use of material witness warrants to detain witnesses to grand jury
proceedings is constitutional. But at the same time, the court was careful
to note that such use is permissible only to achieve the end contemplated
by the statute: securing the witness' testimony. "The district court noted
(and we agree) that it would be improper for the government to use
[material witness warrants] for other ends, such as the detention of
persons suspected of criminal activity for which probable cause has not
yet been established." 155 In short, the court upheld a practice that
concededly interferes with people's Fourth Amendment rights, but only
after conducting a rigorous constitutional review.
Recent amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA") 156 and related regulations also raise Fourth Amendment
concerns. FISA, passed in 1978, was enacted to permit surveillance of
agents of foreign powers operating within the United States; "the
collection of foreign intelligence information is the raison d'etre for the

151. SeeAwadallah, 202 F. Supp. at 59-61.
152. Compare id. (invalidating use of material witness warrant), with In re Application for
Material Witness Warrant (John Doe), 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (approving use of
material witness warrant), and In re Grand Jury Material Witness Detention, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1266
(D. Or. 2003) (same).
153. See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 64. Notably-because the issue was not put before it-the
court did not consider the conditions under which the material witness was detained.
154. Id.at 59.
155. Id.
156. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862
(2000 & Supp. 2003)).
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FISA."' 157 Under FISA, the government may obtain a warrant to conduct

electronic surveillance upon a showing of probable cause that the target
158
of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Accordingly, the showing required to obtain a FISA warrant is

significantly different than that required to obtain a warrant to conduct a
wiretap in a criminal investigation. 159 Because the standards are so
divergent, FISA specifically requires that communications obtained
pursuant to a FISA warrant be limited to intelligence gathering. 160
Pursuant to procedures adopted by Attorney General Janet Reno in
1995161 and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in
2000,162 a "wall" was erected between the counterterrorism and law
enforcement wings of the Department of Justice, and no wiretap
information obtained from a FISA wiretap was to flow through the
wall. 163 More importantly, Department of Justice officials were
prohibited from making recommendations to intelligence officials about
the operation or scope of FISA wiretaps that might enhance criminal

prosecutions. 164

157. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 613 (F.I.S.C. 2002), rev'dsub nom. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct.
Rev. 2002).
158. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
159. Ordinary wiretaps are governed by Title III of the Organized Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, tit. Ill, § 802 82 Stat. 218 (1968) (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. § 2518). A so-called Title III warrant may not issue unless there is: (a) probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed; (b) probable cause to believe that particular
communications concerning the crime will be obtained via wiretapping; (c) a showing that normal
investigative techniques have failed or are unlikely to succeed or are too dangerous; and
(d) probable cause to believe that the numbers to be tapped are owned by or commonly used by the
target. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). In addition, Title III contains a minimization requirement that
requires the government to stop listening once it is clear that a particular communication is not
relevant to its investigation. See id. § 2518(5).
160. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1802(a)(1). The term "minimization" is used in both Title III
and FISA, but the use is quite different. In Title III, minimization refers to the government's duty to
listen to only that part of a conversation relevant to its investigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). In
FISA, minimization refers to the requirement of separating law enforcement and intelligencegathering uses of information collected via electronic surveillance. See id. § 1801(h).
161. See Memorandum from the Attorney General, Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI
and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations
(July
19,
1995)
[hereinafter
Reno
Memorandum),
available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.
162. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d at 620 (describing history on FISA information sharing).
163. See id. at 620. Judges of the FISA court are selected by the Chief Justice of the United
States; he designates eleven federal district judges (seven, prior to the USA PATRIOT Act) from
seven of the judicial circuits, no fewer than three of whom reside within twenty miles of the District
of Columbia, to serve on the court. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a).
164.

See Reno Memorandum, supra note 161.
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However, in the aftermath of September 11, Attorney General
Ashcroft issued new regulations that permit information obtained
pursuant to FISA warrants to be shared with Department of Justice
prosecutors, and permit prosecutors to direct the operation of FISA
wiretaps to aid in criminal prosecutions. 165 The FISA court squarely
rejected the new regulation, holding that the rules permitting law
enforcement to essentially direct the operation of FISA wiretaps "appear
to be designed to amend the law and substitute the FISA for Title III
electronic surveillances and Rule 41 searches,"'' 66 and would result in
criminal prosecutors ...tell[ing] the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps

when they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance),
what techniques to use, what information to look for, what information
to keep as evidence and when use of FISA
167 can cease because there is
enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.
The FISA Court of Review-sitting for the first time, everunanimously reversed. 168 In an extensive decision analyzing FISA and
the 2001 amendments to FISA contained in the USA PATRIOT Act, the
court concluded that the minimization requirements imposed by the
lower court (i.e., the "wall" between intelligence and law enforcement
personnel) were not required. 169 The court engaged in an extensive
Fourth Amendment analysis but did not decide whether FISA warrants
were as valid as Title III warrants in all circumstances for constitutional
purposes. 170 In a holding that requires no comment, the court concluded:
We acknowledge, however, that the constitutional question
presented by this case-whether Congress' disapproval of the primary
purpose test is consistent with the Fourth Amendment-has no
definitive jurisprudential answer.
...

Even without taking into account the President's inherent

constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence
surveillance, we think the procedures and government showings
165. See Memorandum from the Attorney General, Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign
Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI (Mar. 6, 2002),
availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dog/fisa/agO3O6O2.html.
166. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 623.
167. Id.at 624.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
168. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719, 746 (Foreign Int.
169. See In re Sealed Case, 310F.3dat 730, 743.
170. See id. at 737-42 ("We do not decide the issue, but note that to the extent a FISA order
that certainly bears on its reasonableness under the Fourth
comes close to meeting Title III,
Amendment,").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1

826

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:795

required under FISA, ifthey do not meet the minimum Fourth
Amendment warrantstandards,certainly come close. 171
The Fifth Amendment

The treatment of those detained in connection with the war on
terrorism raises serious Fifth Amendment concerns. By designating
some detainees as "enemy combatants," the government has removed
these people from the civil justice system altogether, thereby precluding
judicial oversight.
This policy raises fundamental questions of due process, 172 those
rights that are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," the
abolishment of which would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."", 173 The Due Process clause protects against conduct, the
totality of which "offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-peaking peoples even toward
17 4
those charged with the most heinous offenses."'
Both United States citizens and foreigners have been designated as
enemy combatants, with the latter group detained at Camp Delta on
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 175 Approximately 650 detainees from forty-

171. Id. at 746 (emphasis added). Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA
required that the gathering of foreign intelligence be the "primary purpose" for the government to
proceed with electronic surveillance under FISA. See id. at 732. Under the USA PATRIOT Act,
however, the government need only demonstrate that intelligence gathering is a "significant
purpose" of the investigation in order to obtain a FISA warrant. See id. at 733.
172. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

173. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)).
174. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations
omitted).
175. Camp Delta was formerly known as Camp X-Ray. See Richard J. Wilson, United States
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American Commision on Human Rights Responds to a
"Legal Black Hole, " 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 2 (2003). Camp X-Ray was a temporary detention facility. In
April 2002, construction of a larger and more modem facility, Camp Delta, was completed.
Detainees held at Camp X-Ray were transported to Camp Delta. See Roy Gutman et al.,
GuantanamoJustice?, NEWSWEEK, July 8,2002, at 34, 37.
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three countries have been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2001,176
although in recent months many have been released, 177 while six
others-who will be prosecuted in military tribunals as early as the
summer of 2004-have been transferred to Camp Echo, also on
Guantanamo. 178 Most were captured in or near battlefields in
Afghanistan, although at least six Algerians were transferred from
Bosnia. 179 All of the detainees have been labeled as "enemy" or
"unlawful" combatants rather than as prisoners of war under the Geneva
Convention, 80 and may be held until the end of hostilities, unless they
181
are released earlier or charged and tried before military tribunals.
These detainees are unidentified, have not182been charged, have no access
to counsel, and are regularly interrogated.
Strictly speaking, the terms of the detainees' confinement does not
present a due process problem. The detainees-all of whom are foreign
citizens-are being held as unlawful combatants outside of the criminal
justice system, and indeed, outside of the territorial sovereignty of the
United States. Thus, they have no Fifth Amendment rights. 183
Nonetheless, their confinement and how they got there raise questions
that implicate due process-like concerns.
Two courts have recently held that they are without jurisdiction to
hear petitions for habeas relief brought on behalf of the Guantanamo

176. See, e.g., Army Counselorfor Terror PrisonersHeld, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at A5.
177. See, e.g., U.S. Releases 15 More from Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at A16
(reporting that 134 detainees had been released since January 2003, that twelve have been
transferred to their home countries for continued detention, and that approxinately 595 remain at
Guantanamo).
178. See, e.g., Nancy San Martin, U.S. Military Opens Doors, Sheds Light on Cuba Camp,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 12, 2004, at 1.
179. See Matthew Kaminski, Anti-Terrorism Requires Nation Building, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2002, at A10.
180. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
181. As the Court explained in Quirin,an unlawful combatant, unlike his lawful counterpart, is
subject to interrogation and trial by military tribunal. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942);
Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 4 (describing who is entitled to protections as a prisoner of
war); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining
distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants under the Geneva Convention). Prisoners of
war, by contrast, are held until hostilities cease, at which time they are released; for these soldiers,
"'captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but rather 'a simple war measure,'
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004)
(quoting W. Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2d ed. 1920)).
182. See Wilson, supra note 175.
183. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 273-75 (1990) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment's protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:795

Bay detainees. In Rasul v. Bush, 184 Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that, under
Eisentrager,185 habeas relief is available only to United States citizens
and aliens within the territorial United States or its sovereign territory.186
Because Guantanamo Bay is outside of the United States, the aliens held
there have no recourse to United States courts. 187 The Court of Appeals
affirmed: "The consequence is that no court in this country has
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief.. . to the Guantanamo detainees, even
if they ha[d] not been adjudicated enemies of the United States."' 188 The
British high court, commenting on a suit brought by a British citizen
detained at Guantanamo Bay, summarized the problem: "What appears
to us to be objectionable is that Mr [sic] Abassi should be subject to
indefinite detention in territory over which the United States has
exclusive control with no opportunity to
challenge the legitimacy of his
189
tribunal."'
or
court
any
before
detention
Seizing on this objection, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held that it does have jurisdiction over habeas petitions arising
from the confinement of prisoners on Guantanamo Bay. 190 Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, joined by United States District Judge Milton
Shadur, held that Eisentrager was no bar to jurisdiction. In their view,
Eisentrager permits United States courts to exercise jurisdiction
whenever our government controls a territory, regardless of whether it
has "sovereign" control. 191 The majority was particularly troubled by the

184. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
185. See supra Part III.
186. See Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
187. See id. at 72-73; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well
established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.").
188. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141; see also Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
1046-50 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that United States courts have no jurisdiction over habeas
petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo Bay detainees), affd in part, on other grounds vacated in
part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
189. The Queen (In re Abassi & Anor) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs & Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, EWCA Civ. 1598, 66 (C.A. 2002), availableat
2002 WL 31452052.
190. See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003).
191. See id. ("Although we agree with the government that the legal status of Guantanamo
constitutes the dispositive factor in our jurisdictional inquiry, we do not find that [Eisentrager]
requires sovereignty rather than simply the existence of territorial jurisdiction, which
unquestionably exists here."). The dissent "reluctant[ly]"concluded that Eisentragerdid control. Id.
at 1313 (Graber, J., dissenting).
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government's assertion that by detaining prisoners at Guantanamo, they
could avoid judicial review of the detentions altogether.
We recognize that the process due "enemy combatant" habeas
petitioners may vary with the circumstances and are fully aware of the
unprecedented challenges that affect the United States' national
security interests today, and we share the desire of all Americans to
ensure that the Executive enjoys the necessary power and flexibility to
prevent future terrorist attacks. However, even in times of national
emergency-indeed, particularly in such times-it is the obligation of
the Judicial Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitutional
values and to prevent the Executive Branch from running roughshod
over the rights of citizens and aliens alike. Here, we simply cannot
accept the government's position that the Executive Branch possesses
the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any person, foreign
citizens included, on territory under the sole jurisdiction and control of
the United States, without permitting such prisoners recourse of any
kind to any judicial forum, or even access
92 to counsel, regardless of the
length or manner of their confinement. 1
The Supreme
Court has agreed to review this important jurisdictional
93
question.

1

The judiciary has also been virtually excluded from reviewing the
detention of United States citizens detained within the United States. At
least three individuals-two American citizens and an alien arrested and
detained in the United States-have been designated enemy combatants
and imprisoned in naval brigs. Yaser Hamdi, the first designee,
surrendered to the Northern alliance forces in Afghanistan and was taken
94
to Guantanamo Bay, where his American citizenship was discovered.
The President has designated him as an "enemy combatant.' 95 He is not
currently charged with any crime, is not permitted to see a lawyer, and is
being held indefinitely and, until recently,
196 incommunicado at the
1 97
naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina.'

192. Id. at 1283.
193.
194.
(2004).

See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981

195. Seeid. at461.
196.

See Jerry Markon, Military to Watch PrisonerInterview, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at

B3. Hamdi met with his attorneys on February 3, 2004, in a session tape-recorded by military
personnel. See Jerry Markon, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet for 1st Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2004, at B3 [hereinafter Markon, TerrorSuspect].

197. See Markon, Terror Suspect, supra note 196. Hamdi had previously been held at a naval
brig in Norfolk, Virginia. See id.
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A petition for habeas relief was filed on Hamdi's behalf. 198 The
district court initially permitted Hamdi access to a lawyer to pursue his
petition. 99 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court
had not fully considered the "sweeping implications" of affording
counsel to an enemy combatant.2 °0 On remand, the district judge ordered
production of some additional material regarding Hamdi's designation in
order to consider-in camera-those sweeping implications. 20 1 But the
Fourth Circuit again reversed. 202 After a searching analysis of the
Supreme Court's wartime jurisprudence, the court concluded that "[f]or
the judicial branch to trespass upon the exercise of warmaking powers
would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and selfgovernance at a time when the care of the common defense is most
critical. 20 3
Although the court conceded that "judicial deference to executive
decisions made in the name of war is not unlimited,, 20 4 and indeed, that
"[t]he detention of United States citizens must be subject to judicial
review, ' 20 5 it also held that a two page conclusory hearsay affidavit filed
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
(2004).
203.
Circuit:

See
See
See
See
See

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002).
id.
at 280.
id. at 282-83.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981

Id. at 463. The Hamdi opinion garnered significant criticism, even from within the Fourth

In resting its decision on [a] factually and legally untenable ground, the panel
reneged on the promise it hastily made to the parties at the litigation's inception.
It promised the citizen seized by the government "meaningful judicial review" of his
claim that he was not an enemy combatant, pointedly refusing to "embrace a sweeping
proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or
counsel on the government's say-so." But it ultimately provided that citizen a review that
actually entailed absolutely no judicial inquiry into the facts on the basis of which the
government designated that citizen as an enemy combatant.
But as the panel disowned its promise to the detainee to provide him meaningful
judicial review, so also did it disown its promise to the Executive to accord him the
substantial deference to which he is constitutionally entitled for his wartime decisions as
to who constitute enemies of the United States. The panel promised the Executive that
the Judiciary would not sit in full review of his judgments as to who is an enemy
combatant of the United States, but it adopted a rule that will henceforth do just that, cast
the Judiciary as ultimate arbiter, in each and every instance, of whether the Executive
has properly so classified a detainee.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)) (alterations in original omitted).
204. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 464.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
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by Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, who wrote that Hamdi was "affiliated with a Taliban military
unit and received weapons training," was sufficient to justify the
detention. 2 06 "Asking the executive to provide more detailed factual
assertions would be to wade further into the conduct of war than we
consider appropriate and is unnecessary to a meaningful judicial review
of this question., 20 7 The executive, in other words, did not even have to
present "some evidence" in support of its designation:
[W]e hold that, despite his status as an American citizen currently
detained on American soil, Hamdi is not entitled to challenge the facts
presented in the Mobbs declaration. Where, as here, a habeas petitioner
has been designated an enemy combatant and it is undisputed that he
was captured in an [sic] zone of active combat operations abroad,
further judicial inquiry is unwarranted when the government has
responded to the petition by setting forth factual assertions which
20 8
would establish a legally valid basis for the petitioner's detention.
Thus, while the court asserted that complete deference was not
required, its words and actions were at odds. The court refused to hear
evidence in support of, or in opposition to, Hamdi's petition-the
hearsay declaration of a Department of Justice official was sufficient.
The second American designated as an "enemy combatant" was
Jose Padilla, a Brooklyn-born United States citizen, arrested on May 8,
2002, at O'Hare airport, shortly after arriving from Pakistan. He was
arrested on information obtained from a captured member of al Qaeda
who linked him to a plot to create and detonate a so-called "dirty
bomb. 20 9 Padilla was originally held in New York as a material witness,
but was transferred two days prior to a scheduled court hearing and
designated an "enemy combatant."2 10 He is now being held in a military
brig in South Carolina; he has not been charged, 2 11 and, like Hamdi, was
held incommunicado until recently.2 12
206.
207.
208.
209.
material,

See id. at 472, 473.
Id.at 473.
ld. at 476.
A dirty bomb is a device that uses conventional explosives to distribute radioactive
much like radioactive shrapnel. See Tony Karon, The "Dirty Bomb" Scenario, TIME

ONLINE EDITION, June 10, 2002, availableat http://www.time.com.

210. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
211. Seeid. at569.
212. See News Release, United States Dep't of Defense, Padilla Allowed Access to Lawyer
Release],
at
Padilla
News
[hereinafter
(Feb.
11,
2004)
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040211-0341.html; see also John J. Lumpkin,
PentagonAllows Padillato See Lawyer, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2004, at http://washingtonpost.com.
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Padilla's attorney, appointed when he was held as a material
witness, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging Padilla's
designation as an enemy combatant.2 13 Chief Judge Michael Mukasey of
the Southern District of New York, in an opinion drawing heavily on
Quirin, held that the President was well within his constitutional
authority to designate an American citizen as an enemy combatant, and
potentially, to try that citizen before a military tribunal.214 But, Judge
Mukasey also held that his designation is not beyond judicial review-it
requires a showing that "there is some evidence to support [the
President's] conclusion that Padilla was, like the German saboteurs in
Quirin, engaged in a mission against the United States on behalf of an
enemy with whom the United States is at war., 21 5 Moreover, Judge
Mukasey permitted Padilla to consult with an attorney to challenge the
sufficiency of the government's proffered evidence.21 6
On appeal, a divided panel of the Second Circuit went further,
squarely holding that "the President does not have the power under
Article II of the Constitution to detain as an enemy combatant an
2 17
American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat."
The court's decision was based largely on the perceived absence of
congressional authorization for the detention, notwithstanding the need
to show the appropriate deference:
We agree that great deference is afforded the President's exercise of
his authority as Commander-in-Chief. We also agree that whether a
state of armed conflict exists against an enemy to which the laws of
war apply is a political question for the President, not the courts.
Because we have no authority to do so, we do not address the
According to the Defense Department's News Release, the Department permitted the meeting after
it completed its interrogation of Padilla and determined that access to a lawyer would not "interfere
with intelligence collection" from that enemy combatant. Padilla News Release, supra. Padilla's

meeting with his attorney took place on March 3, 2004, and was tape-recorded by a military
observer. See Bruce Smith, Lawyers Finally Meet with Dirty Bomb Suspect, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar.
4, 2004, at 30.
213.

See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.

214. See id. at 593-96, 610.
215. Id. at 608.
216.

See id. at 604.

217. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003). That Padilla was arrested in the
United States distinguishes Padilla's case from Hamdi's, as both courts of appeal noted. See id. at
698 (stating "we do not address the detention of an American citizen seized within a zone of combat
in Afghanistan, such as the court confronted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating "[w]e have no occasion ... to address the designation as an enemy
combatant of an American citizen captured on American soil"); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337
F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("To compare this battlefield capture to
the domestic arrest in Padillav. Bush is to compare apples and oranges.").
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government's underlying assumption that
218 an undeclared war exists
between al Qaeda and the United States.
Yet, relying on the Steel Seizure Cases,219 the court determined that

the executive lacks the inherent constitutional authority to detain an
American citizen captured in the United States as an enemy combatant,
and that congress had not conferred such power on him. 220 Notably, the
court declined to regard a joint resolution of Congress that empowered
the president to "use necessary and appropriate force . . . 'in order to

prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States"' as sufficient authorization. 22 Accordingly, the court ordered
Padilla to be released, transferred to civilian authorities to be criminally
prosecuted, or, if appropriate, detained as a material witness.222
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in both Hamdi
and Padilla.23 Taken together, these cases speak to the proper scope of
presidential authority to detain American citizens, regardless of where
they are captured. As Professor Harold Koh has described it, a resolution
of these cases will determine whether there is such a thing as an "extralegal person"-that is, a person to whom the law does not apply. 4 And,
in al Odah and Rasul, the Court will address whether there are "extralegal zones. 2 25 In hearing these four cases, the Court will have the
opportunity to address the contours of the rule of law during war time.
The granting of certiorari in these cases signals the Supreme Court's
willingness to involve itself as a co-equal branch of government during

218. Padilla,352 F.3d at 712 (citations omitted).
219. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
220. Relying on The Prize Cases, Judge Richard Wesley dissented, arguing that the executive
has the inherent authority to "prosecute armed conflicts when, as on September 11, 2001, the United
States is attacked." Padilla,352 F.3d at 728 (Wesley, J., dissenting). Judge Wesley also would have
held that, absent inherent authority, the congressional joint resolution sufficiently authorized the
President to detain Padilla. See id. at 729 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
2
221. Id. at 729 (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-40, § (a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)); see also id.at
725-26 (reprinting the congressional joint resolution as Appendix B to the opinion).
222. See id. at 724.
223. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981
(2004).
224. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1498
(2003) ("[I]nstead of declaring a state of emergency, or announcing broadscale changes in the rules
by which the United States had previously accepted and internalized international human rights
standards, the administration has opted instead for a two-pronged strategy of creating extralegal
zones, most prominently the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where scores of security
detainees are held without legal recourse, and extralegal persons-particularlythose detainees
labeled 'enemy combatants,' who, even if American citizens on American soil, are effectively
accorded no recognized legal avenue to assert either substantive or procedural rights.").
225. See id. at 1510-11; see also supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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wartime, something that it has been reluctant to do during past wars. As
Judge Wesley, dissenting in Padilla,explained:
Mr. Padilla's case reveals the unique dynamics of our constitutional
government. Padilla is alleged to be a member of an organization that
most Americans view with anger and distrust. Yet his legal claims
receive careful and thoughtful attention and are examined not in the
light of his cause-whatever it may be-but by the 226
constitutional and
statutory validity of the powers invoked against him.
The Sixth Amendment
By and large, the government has been loathe to make blanket
policies that are potentially violative of the Sixth Amendment, 227
although the closed immigration hearings and military tribunal cases
implicate similar rights. Nonetheless, Sixth Amendment questions have
arisen on an ad hoc basis.
For example, Judge John Koeltl of the Southern District of New
York recently dismissed several counts of an indictment against Lynne
Stewart, the lawyer to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called "blind
228
cleric" who orchestrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
Although Stewart's case did not directly raise a Sixth Amendment
violation-since she, and not her client, had been indicted-it certainly
raised Sixth Amendment concerns, as Stewart was indicted because she
was Abdel Rahman's attorney.
Stewart was indicted for providing "material support or resources to
a foreign terrorist organization" 229 by, among other things, announcing
to the press that her client had withdrawn his support for a then-existing
cease-fire among militant Islamic groups.23 ° Stewart was thus charged
with providing "personnel" or "communications equipment" 231 _i.e.,
226. Padilla,352 F.3d at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
227. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

228. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2003).
230. See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 355
231. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2003) (defining "material support or resources" to include the
provisions of, among other things, communications equipment and personnel).
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herself and the press-to Abdel Rahman and his terrorist group.232 Judge
Koeltl dismissed these charges, holding that the government had
"fail[ed] to explain how a lawyer, acting as an agent of her client ...
could avoid being subject to criminal prosecution." 233 The court
recognized that a lawyer must be free to represent her client without the
spectre of prosecution even, as in Stewart's case, when her
representation falls outside of the usual boundaries of the attorney-client
relationship.234
One case has directly raised Sixth Amendment issues. Zacarias
Moussaoui, the so-called "twentieth hijacker," has been charged for his
role in connection with the September 11 attacks themselves, 235 and has
opted to act as his own counsel.236 In the preparation of his defense,
Moussaoui has sought access to alleged terrorist ringleader Ramzi bin alShibh. Moussaoui believes that Al-Shibh, who is now in federal custody,
can provide exculpatory evidence.237 The government has argued that
national security would be compromised by allowing Moussaoui access
to Al-Shibh.2 38
In a heavily redacted opinion, Judge Leonie Brinkema of the
Eastern District of Virginia agreed with Moussaoui, holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not outweighed by
claims that the government's intelligence-gathering efforts would be
232. See Sattar,272 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.
233. Id. at 359. In UnitedStates v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002), the case of the
so-called "American Taliban," the court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that someone who
offered himself in direct service to a terrorist organization in fact had provided "personnel." See id.
at 572-73. But in that case, the defendant had offered himself up as a soldier in the army of the
terrorist organization, not as a lawyer representing a terrorist in a court of law. See id. at 545-47.
234. Stewart's statements to the press, for example, were made after Abdel Rahman had been
tried, convicted and sentenced, and had exhausted all of his appeals. See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at
354-55. In November 2003-four months after Judge Koeltl dismissed the charges-the
government filed a superseding indictment charging Stewart with providing material support to an
international plot to kill and kidnap people in a foreign country. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a). The new
indictment still charges Stewart with providing "personnel" to the conspiracy, but now the
"personnel" alleged in the indictment is Sheikh Abdel Rahman (her client), not Stewart herself. The
indictment also expanded the conspiracy charged to include the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Stewart has moved to dismiss the superseding
indictment. See Mark Hamblett, New Lynne Stewart Charges Raise Hurdle for Government,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 2004, at 1; Patricia Hurtado, Terror Case Defense, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Apr. 10,
2004, at A 1l.
235. It is alleged that Moussaoui planned to hijack an airplane on September 11, 2001, and fly
it into the White House. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699,
*1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003).
236. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 1877700, *1 (E.D. Va. Feb.
28, 2003).
237. See Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699 at *1.
238. Seeid. at*2.
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undermined.239 The Fourth
Circuit dismissed the government's appeal
240
for lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Brinkema's decision recognizes the tension between a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the government's legitimate
security concerns.
When the Government elected to bring Moussaoui to trial in this
civilian tribunal, it assumed the responsibility of abiding by wellestablished principles of due process. To the extent that the United
States seeks a categorical, "wartime" exception to the Sixth
Amendment, it should reconsider whether the civilian criminal courts
are the appropriate fora in which to prosecute alleged terrorists
captured in the context of an ongoing war.
On remand, the government continued to refuse to provide Moussaoui
access to bin Al-Shibh, and Judge Brinkema responded by determining

239. See id. at *5-6. As noted, Judge Brinkema's opinion in Moussaoui was released to the
public only after heavy redaction, including AI-Shibh's identity. However, media sources
unanimously report that Al-Shibh is the subject of the ruling. See, e.g., Editorial, The Trial of
Zacarias Moussaoui,N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A16.
240. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 517 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 336
F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003). Although the panel originally held that Judge Brinkema's order was a
discovery order not susceptible to interlocutory appeal, there was spirited debate on this issue when
the government moved for rehearing by the en banc court. Chief Judge William W. Wilkins,
concurring in the denial of rehearing, accused the dissenters of "allow[ing] the importance of the
issues involved in the underlying merits of this appeal to cloud their judgment on the purely legal
question ofjurisdiction." Moussaoui, 336 F.3d at 279-80 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
In three separate opinions urging rehearing en banc, the dissenters argued that Judge
Brinkema's decision was appealable under the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C.
app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000). At the same time, the dissenters met Judge Wilkins' remarks, writing that
"[w]e must not, in resolving this jurisdictional question, turn a blind eye to reality. The courts have
placed one suspected al Qaeda operative in touch with another, and then denied to the United States
the right to promptly appeal that decision." Moussaoui, 336 F.3d at 285 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
In addition, Judge Michael Luttig authored a strong dissent, arguing that review of Judge
Brinkema's order was not only proper, it "is necessary in the interests of national security, as has
been represented to us on behalf of the President of the United States." Id. at 286 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting). This remark caused Judge Wilkins to characterize the dissenters' views as follows:
My colleague apparently would have us simply rule in favor of the government in all
cases like this one. From his limited review of the petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc, the accuracy of which he assumes, he believes-because the
Government asserts national security interests and because he speculates about national
security interests the Government does not assert-that it is our duty to exercise
jurisdiction without waiting to determine whether any sanction that might be imposed
would be acceptable to the Government. Siding with the Government in all cases where
national security concerns are asserted would entail surrender of the independence of the
judicial branch and abandonment of our sworn commitment to uphold the rule of law.
Id. at 281-82 (Wilkins, J., concurring)
241. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699 at *6 (citations omitted).
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an appropriate sanction. 242 Although she did not accept the defense's
argument that the case should be dismissed, Judge Brinkema did rule
that Moussaoui could not be subject to capital punishment, nor could the
government introduce any evidence at trial that Moussaoui participated
in or had knowledge of the September 11 attacks.243 Such a sanction,
Judge Brinkema reasoned, would render bin Al-Shibh's testimony
immaterial; the government's refusal to produce bin al-Shibh would
therefore not offend Moussaoui's right to a fair trial. 2 "
In another heavily redacted opinion, the Fourth Circuit crafted a
curious compromise. It held that Moussaoui is entitled to bin Al-Shibh's
testimony because his (Moussaoui's) Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process outweighs the government's privilege. 245 If the
government intended to persist in refusing to produce bin Al-Shibh, as it
had vowed to do, the court recognized that "dismissal of the indictment
is the usual course." 246 Rather than dismiss the case against Moussaoui,
however, the court cobbled together a less drastic solution: Moussaoui
would be given access to, and could present to the jury, a compilation of
summaries of reports of bin Al-Shibh's statements taken by the
government. These statements, the court reasoned, were a fair proxy for
the ability to depose bin Al-Shibh.247 The death penalty, therefore, would
remain an option.
Rather than pursue a public trial in a civilian court with the required
panoply of constitutional rights, the government may soon opt to detain
Moussaoui as an enemy combatant like Hamdi, Padilla, and the
Guantanamo Bay detainees. 248 Moussaoui's prosecution, when and if it
occurs, would then be before a military commission.

242. See id. at *5-6.
243. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), vacated and
remanded by United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th.Cir. 2003).

244. See id.
245.
246.

See365F.3dat310.
Id. At 312.

247. Id. at 315-16. Indeed, the panel stated that it "shall not, indeed ... must not, question the
Government's determination that permitting the witnesses to be deposed would put our nation's
security at risk." Id. at 328 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248.

See generally David Crawford & Jess Bravin, German Terror Suspect is Acquitted, Wall

St. J., Feb. 6, 2004, at AI5 ("In the case of Mr. Moussaoui, after the government refused to let
defense lawyers interview Mr. Binalshibh, a judge dismissed capital charges. The government has
appealed the ruling, but should it lose, many within the Bush administration urge that Mr.
Moussaoui be transferred to military custody, where as a noncitizen he could be tried by a tribunal

lacking many of the protections afforded by civilian courts."). The German terror suspect referenced
in the title of the just-cited article, Abdelghani Mzoudi (who had been charged with, amongst other
things, three thousand counts of accessory to murder in connection with the September II attacks),
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The Differing Responses of Districtand Appellate Courts
One unavoidable trend that runs through these decisions is that trial
courts have, on the whole, been less willing to accept the government's
unsupported assertions of necessity and national security than have the
appellate courts-although some of the most recent appellate decisions
have not only challenged the executive's decisions, but in some case
have invalidated them. While there are many possible explanations for
this phenomenon, we describe several that we feel may be of particular
interest.
First, trial courts are in the business of judging credibility, and are
deeply uncomfortable deferring to those who offer conclusory
allegations without factual support. All too often in a trial judge's
experience, a bit of probing reveals that conclusory allegations are
baseless.
Second, trial courts have daily experience with the application of
constitutional rights, rather than a more distanced philosophical or
theoretical familiarity. For example, a trial court knows the vast
difference in the development of factual and legal issues when a party is
represented by counsel as opposed to a litigant acting without the benefit
of counsel. Similarly, a trial court must assess whether the government
has established sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant. Often a
judge will decide that probable cause is lacking or will ask for the
submission of additional evidence to support the request for a warrant.
Another daily experience is the trial process itself. Trial judges regularly
decide what information is privileged and/or confidential. They review
material in camera to make these determinations. They consider whether
the government must make certain information available to a defendant
and the impact that failing to disclose information has on the trial
process. There are many more such examples, but the point is clear-the
application of rights, in the real world, can make a big difference with
respect to life or death, freedom or the loss of it, the right to work or be
deprived of work, or the right to individualized justice rather than the
application of unfair stereotypes (e.g., racial profiling) or
generalizations.24 9
was acquitted in part because the Department of Justice refused him access to the same Ramzi bin
AI-Shibh that would have allegedly exonerated Moussaoui. See id.
249.

There is historical support for this argument. In Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten,244 F. 535

(S.D.N.Y. 1917), for example, then-District Judge Learned Hand issued an injunction against New
York State's postmaster general, requiring him to extend full mailing privileges to The Masses, a
Socialist paper. See id. at 543. In an opinion that history has treated very unfavorably, see, for
example, Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment:
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Third, the political views of appellate judges play a more important
role in their selection and confirmation. Most of the close questioning of
judicial nominees is saved for appellate judges. Their academic writings
or judicial decisions are scrutinized for the political views they express.
Those holding certain views are screened out by one political party or
the other. Most confirmation battles concern appellate court nominees,
not district court nominees. 250 Thus, district court judges may be less
politically committed than their appellate counterparts, and less
burdened by those commitments. 251 Along the same lines, many
appellate judges may believe their judicial record will be scrutinized yet
again if they are ever considered for the highest court, and are therefore
more reluctant to take an unpopular position.
A related question is why some appellate panels have applied the
same sort of deference as in wars past, while others have engaged in a
more searching analysis of the actions of the political branches. Of all
the possible explanations that come to mind, chief among them is that as
time passes and the events of September 11 recede, it is easier (although
still not easy) to be both dispassionate and objective. The same thing
happened in earlier wars, with the courts more willing to challenge
executive authority with the passage of time. For example, the Court
decided Hirabayashiin the thick of World War II. Just one year laterMasses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, (1990), the Court of Appeals reversed. See
Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten,246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917). Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision
granting a writ of habeas corpus in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), affirmed the
judgment of the District Court of Hawaii, which the Ninth Circuit had reversed, see id. at 312, 324.

250.

In recent years, for example, Democrats in Congress have rejected the nomination of

Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, see Sarah Pollack, The Mother of All Supreme Court
Nomination Battles (Jul. 29, 2003), available at http://www.cbn.com, and have effectively

blocked-by filibuster or otherwise-seven nominees to federal appeals courts on the basis that
these candidates are "too conservative." See generally Thomas Ferraro, Daschle to Block Nominees,

PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 2004, at A2. Earlier, Republicans in Congress blocked the nomination of
Bonnie Campbell to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and delayed the confirmation of numerous
other Clinton nominees for years at a time. Judge Richard Paez, for example, endured a then-record
1,506-day wait between his nomination and confirmation to the Ninth Circuit. See Mickey Kaus, No
Justice, No Paez, Mar. 11, 2000, at http://slate.msn.com/ (quoting reporter Richard Simon); see
generally PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ORDERING THE COURTS: RIGHT-WING ATTACKS ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 2000, at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_314.pdf (last visited

May 22, 2004).
251. This political reality takes on added significance in the context of civil liberties cases,
where ideologues on both the left and the right tend towards libertarianism and are less sympathetic
to the government's arguments. Compare Robert H. Bork, Civil Liberties After 9/11,
COMMENTARY, July-Aug. 2003, at 29, with John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting
"'EnduringFreedom"for "Homeland Security": A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the USA PATRIOT

Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 (2002), and
ACLU, Insatiable Appetite: The Government's Demandfor New and Unnecessary Powers After
September 11 (2002), availableat www.aclu.org.
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but after American forces landed on Normandy beach and in the
Philippines, and the Japanese threat had all but subsided-the Court
essentially reversed itself in Endo. Two years later (and after the
Japanese surrender), the Court was even more critical of executive
action in Duncan v. Kahanamoku. Nearly three years after the
September 11 attacks, both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein have been
deposed, and most importantly, there has not been another terrorist
incident on U.S. soil. As the exigency of war decreases, the judiciary is
less reluctant to do its job.2 52
Another interesting question is why judges have been less
deferential toward government actions taken during the current "War on
Terrorism" than toward actions taken by the political branches during
the Civil War and World Wars I and II. This question, too, offers
interesting grounds for speculation. First, World War II was the last war
declared by Congress. That extra authorization may have given more
Constitutional coverage or legitimacy to all actions taken by either the
legislative or executive branch.253 Second, and more likely, in earlier
conflicts, the nation felt that it was at war. While this distinction is not
252. There are other possible explanations for the turn-about in appellate case law. For one,
some of the judges authoring these decisions are self-acknowledged liberals. For example, the Ninth
Circuit decision finding habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay was authored by Stephen
Reinhardt, who was in the majority in the Ninth Circuit's recent decision striking down the phrase
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. granted sub noma.Elk Grove United School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003).
Indeed, in a recent interview, Judge Reinhardt identified "[t]he overly-restrictive view of individual
rights and liberties that is prevalent in today's judiciary and limits the ability of the federal courts to
play their intended role properly" as his least favorite aspect of being a federal judge. Howard
Bashman, 20 Questionsfor Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, (Feb. 2, 2004), at http://20q-appellateblog.blogspot.com/2004 02 01 20qappellateblog archive.html#107569802077271073. Another possibility is that the correct results in
the various cases were different, and that some policies were appropriately reviewed under
heightened deference, while others were properly reviewed de novo. But we doubt this is the case.
For one, that increasingly rigorous review of the political branches' actions correlates closely with
the passing of time is apparent. For another, some appellate decisions squarely contradict others.
Compare,e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted 124 S. Ct.
534 (holding that there is no habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay), with Gherebi v. Bush, 352
F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is).
253. The Fourth Circuit rejected this view in Hamdi:
We have emphasized that the unconventional aspects of the present struggle do not make
its stakes any less grave. Nor does the nature of the present conflict render respect for the
judgments of the political branches any less appropriate. We have noted that the political
branches are best positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context, and neither
the absence of set-piece battles nor the intervals of calm between terrorist assaults suffice
to nullify the warmaking authority entrusted to the executive and legislative branches.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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easy to define, an illustration may suffice. In the earlier wars, the United
States was at war in the sense that its citizens were mobilized and
deployed either to defend the homeland or to fight uniformed armies
abroad. There were identifiable combatants who would either win or
lose, and the war would end with a surrender, a treaty or a decisive and
devastating victory. Sacrifice at home was visible. Rationing was
required so that military supplies could be produced and shipped as
needed. Blackout curtains were required and curfews were not
uncommon. Everyone had a relative or neighbor involved in the war
effort. There was a draft.
The "War on Terror" is different. Surely we entered the war
because our homeland was attacked. But it was attacked by outlaws, not
a foreign state. No country has declared war on the United States and
this war will not end with a surrender or a treaty. Indeed it may never
end; it may become a way of life. Life goes on at home as it did before
the attacks. The lights are on twenty-four hours, people trade in the stock
market, take exotic vacations, and continue to spend their money on
such "necessities" as digital cameras, Blackberries, diamonds and sports
cars. This is in no way intended to demean the sacrifice that American
soldiers have made in support of their country. Rather, we recognize that
while those soldiers fight overseas, life on the home front is much as it
was before.
Another reason why the judicial reaction to the current war has
been different than in the past is that the vast majority of active judges
have never fought in a war or even served in the military. They grew up
during the Vietnam War, which many viewed as an unjust war. They
lived through Watergate and developed a distrust of government. The
natural skepticism arising from these experiences may make them
instinctively less deferential to actions taken by the political branches
than were their predecessors.
And finally, the decisions made in wartime have not withstood the
test of time. As every law student knows, Korematsu is a major
embarrassment, trumped only by Dredd Scott v. Sandford,25 4 Plessy v.
Ferguson,255 and Lochner v. New York. 6 In sum, whatever the reason,
the trial judges today appear more willing to scrutinize the actions taken
by the political branch with an eye on the Constitution.
254. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), overruled by constitutional amendment by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
255. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
256. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421 (1952) andFerguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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V.
The political branches are well aware of the role of the judiciary,
and of the twin concepts of separation of powers and checks and
balances. Because they are also aware that effective judicial review
might frustrate them from pursuing policies believed to be necessary to
the war effort, the political branches have sought to insulate their actions
from judicial oversight. They have done this in three ways: (1) by
preventing the judiciary from performing its traditional role as neutral
magistrate and by eliminating public hearings or trials; (2) by lowering
the standards controlling the government's ability to seize information,
thereby limiting the power of the judiciary to require adherence to
Constitutional standards; and (3) by intimidating judges so as to
discourage them from fulfilling their traditional functions of judicial
review and the exercise of discretion.
Since September 11, 2001, we have lived with the rhetoric of war.
When voices were raised to question, if not criticize, provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act, Attorney General Ashcroft said, "to those who
scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our national unity
and diminish our resolve." 257 Judges are not exempted from this
message. To the contrary, the comment might just as well have been
aimed at them. It is not easy to be accused of, in effect, aiding the
terrorists.25 8 Yet if a judge concludes that liberty has been lost because of
a government action, and says so, that is the very accusation she may
face.
Excluding the Judiciary
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT")
Act was passed six weeks after September 11, by a vote of 98-1 in the

257. Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 313 (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John

Ashcrofi), available at 2001 WL 26188084. This message was not lost on Congress, where the USA
PATRIOT Act passed without any serious opposition. Attorney General Asheroft gave a brief

statement on behalf of the Act, but he took no questions. Three brief statements were made by
Senators in favor of passage; none were made in opposition.
258.

See, e.g., Osama'sFavoriteJudge, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A20.
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Senate. 259 The legislation, drafted by the Justice Department, was never
seriously debated by Congress.260
The Act was designed to strengthen domestic police power and
surveillance to prevent a repeat of the September 11 attacks. One of the
key vehicles that Congress chose to achieve these goals was to eliminate
the judiciary's role in approving investigations. For example, prior to the
Act's passage, a governmental official could only obtain information
from an Internet Service Provider with a warrant or court order, or on the
consent of the customer.2 6' Under the USA PATRIOT Act, however, the
same authorities can use an administrative subpoena-that is, their own
signature-to obtain a variety of account information, including the
name and address on the account, usage records, and payment
information such as credit card or bank account numbers.262
Executive orders and regulations have also been used to eliminate
court supervision. A week after the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act,
the Justice Department issued a new Bureau of Prisons regulation
authorizing the government to eavesdrop on attorney-client
communications.26 3 The monitoring may occur whenever the Attorney
General determines that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a[n]
... inmate may use the communications with attorneys ... to ...
facilitate acts of terrorism. ' ' 264 The term "inmate" is defined to include

anyone "held as [a] witness, detainee[], or otherwise," and obviously
includes those held as material witnesses or by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS").

265

No warrant is required for this

eavesdropping, and thus there is no need to obtain judicial approval.26 6
The USA PATRIOT Act also permits the detention of aliens
without probable cause (and without presentment to a court), albeit for
limited periods of times.267 If the Attorney General certifies that he has
reasonable grounds to believe that an alien has engaged in terrorism259. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C. and Fed. R. Crim. P.).
260. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Bush Set to Sign: Measure Provides Tools White House Sought,
with Some Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al.
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (1994) (as amended by The Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-441, § 207(a)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 4629 (1994)).
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), (c)(2) (2000) (as amended by The USA PATRIOT Act § 210).
263. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-501 (2002).
264. Id. § 501.3(d).
265. Id. § 500.1(c). The INS is now known as the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services, and is part of the new Department of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. § 277; Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195-97 (2002).
266. See28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002).
267. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2), (e) (2004).
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related activities (defined as the "use of any weapon... with intent to
endanger... the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial
damage to property"), 268 the alien may be detained for up to seven days
without charges or the commencement of proceedings. 269 If removal
proceedings are not commenced after seven days, the alien can be held
without charges indefinitely, upon the Attorney General's certification
that the person's release "will threaten the national security of the United
States or the safety of the community or any person." 270 Similarly, the
Attorney General issued a regulation on September 17, 2001, permitting
the INS to detain any alien, legal or illegal for any reason without any
charge. 271 This detention may be extended for an unspecified "additional
reasonable period of time" in the event of an "emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance." 272 In either case, the court has no role in
determining whether there is probable cause to detain the alien or to
review the decision to permit and continue the detention.
Thus, the detention of approximately twelve hundred foreign
nationals residing in the United States was accomplished without any
judicial finding on whether these detentions were necessary. 273 The
executive branch, alone, decided who would be detained, refused to
release the names of the detainees, insisted on closed hearings and
avoided any court review. 274 As we have noted, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals has ruled that these secret hearings violate the First
Amendment. The thrust of this ruling was the need to permit the
judiciary to evaluate the necessity for the closed hearings and act as a
check on unfettered executive power. Three appellate judges (and one
district judge, sitting by designation) have disagreed with the
government's argument that its actions arise from military necessity, two
have supported the government. 275 But regardless of whether the
268. 8 U.S.C. § II 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) (2003).
269. See USA PATRIOT Act § 412.
270. Id.
271. See 66 Fed. Reg. 48334 (interim rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) on Sept. 20, 2001).
272. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2003).
273. See Christopher Drew & Adam Liptak, Immigration Groups Fault Rule on Automatic
Detention of Some Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at B 15.
274. See Susan Sachs, U.S. Deports Most of Those Arrested in Sweeps After 9/11], N.Y. TIMES,
July 11,2002, at A20.
275. That is to say, the unanimous three-judge panel in the Detroit Free Press (Circuit Judges
Damon Keith and Martha Craig Daughtrey, and District Judge James G. Carr of the Northern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation) and the dissenter in North Jersey Media Group (now-Chief
Judge Anthony Scirica) have found a right of access to the closed immigration hearings. See Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,
308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002). Only the two-judge majority of the Third Circuit panel in North
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hearings are open or closed, the fact remains that twelve hundred foreign
nationals are being detained with only minimal judicial oversight.
Foreign nationals arrested outside of the United States are being
held at Guantanamo Bay. Surely one reason for this peculiar geographic
placement is to avoid judicial review of the aliens' seizure, their
unlimited detention, and the conditions of their confinement. As
demonstrated by the cases discussed in Part IV, supra, some courts have
acknowledged that they have no power to review actions taken in
Guantanamo Bay as it is not a part of the United States.
And then there are the "enemy combatants," held within the United
States but outside the bounds of the civilian justice system. Why was
Padilla removed from the civilian courts? As described earlier, Padilla
was first arrested as a material witness, but two days before a scheduled
court hearing, he was designated an "enemy combatant" and removed
from the civil courts to military custody. In his new designation as a
military prisoner, the government contends that the court has no role in
reviewing his designation as an "enemy combatant," the legitimacy of
his confinement or his entitlement to any rights under the Constitution,
although he is an American citizen. The Second Circuit held otherwise,
but the government is pressing its position, and Padilla remains in a
naval brig awaiting the Supreme Court's decision.
In a more recent case, the President designated a Qatari citizen, Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, as an enemy combatant just a week before a
suppression hearing was scheduled in his criminal case, after a
connection between al-Marri and al Qaeda was uncovered. 276 AlMarri-who had been in jail since the Fall of 2001 on identity-theft
charges unrelated to any suspected acts of terrorism-was removed from
the civilian justice system and transferred to a naval brig in South

Jersey Media Group (then-Chief Judge Edward Becker and Judge Morton Greenberg) have held
otherwise. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 199.
276. See United States v. AI-Marri, No. 03-10044 (C.D. 111.June 23, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf (attaching order designating AlMarri an enemy combatant). See generally Another "Enemy Combatant," (June 23, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/23/attack. Al-Marri, like Hamdi and Padilla before him,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court in Illinois declined to issue the writ,
finding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case with AI-Marri now residing in South Carolina. See
AI-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Ill. 2003). The Seventh Circuit affirmed in March
2004, see AI-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004), and, as of this writing, AI-Marri has
neither appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision-though it is at odds with parts of the Second
Circuit's decision in Padillav. Bush, 352 F.3d 695, 704-10 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that, by naming
a cabinet officer as a respondent, a prisoner may litigate in any federal judicial district)-nor filed a
new petition in South Carolina.
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Carolina, where the authorities believe he can be more effectively
interrogated.27 7
Finally, even within the civilian courts, the government is seeking
to prevent a defendant from exercising his constitutional rights.
Ironically, Judge Brinkema's decision has put Zacarias Moussaoui in a
classic "Catch 22." If Moussaoui wants to be tried in the civilian courts,
he must surrender his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; if
he insists on exercising that right, his prosecution will be moved to a
military tribunal and he will not only lose his right to compulsory
278
process, but many other constitutional rights as well.
Limiting the Power of the Judiciary
Several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act limit, if not eliminate,
the judiciary in the exercise of its power to ensure that government
actions comply with the requirements imposed by the Constitution. Until
now, all seizures of persons or tangible things were governed by the
Fourth Amendment. The only exception to the requirement that the
government demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target of the
warrant is involved in criminal activity was in the area of foreign
intelligence, where the special FISA court was permitted to apply a
relaxed standard, albeit one that still required a showing of probable
cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power.279
Now, when reviewing certain applications for seizing records
(electronic or paper), the courts can no longer insist on a showing of
probable cause, as the Fourth Amendment would require. Section 215 of
277. At the time ofal-Marri's designation, Attorney General Ashcroft explained,
"An individual with that kind of situation is an individual who might know a lot about
what could happen, might know the names of individuals, information being so key to
intelligence and prevention.... Prevention being our No. 1 objective, we decided we
would be best served with him detained as an enemy combatant."
Al
Qaeda
Suspect
Declared
"Enemy
Combatant,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/23/qatar.combatant (June 24, 2003) (quoting Attorney General
John Ashcroft).
278. See generally DefenseLINK, U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, DoD Issues
Military Commission Instructions, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/b05022003_bt297
03.html (describing defendant's rights and procedures for use in military tribunals). A detainee
recently filed suit challenging the tribunal system set up by the government, and, in particular, that
the tribunal's decisions are not to be reviewable by civilian courts. See Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Swift v. Rumsfeld, No. CV04-0777L (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2004); see generally John
Mintz, Yemeni's Attorney Tries to Halt Tribunals, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at A15. But see Ex
parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
279. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
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the Act, for example, permits the seizure of a subject's library or bank
records based solely on a showing that the seizures "relate to" an
investigation of terrorism or clandestine intelligence. 80 This provision
applies to anyone who resides in the United States, citizen or noncitizen. It is important to note that the Act defines "terrorism" as any
"acts dangerous to human life," which could include classic domestic
crimes of murder, rape or robbery. 28 ' Furthermore, this section contains
a gag order provision that prohibits the bank or library from revealing
that it has produced documents.28 2 Without knowledge that its records
have been seized, it is overwhelmingly likely that the subject of the
seizure will be unable to challenge the search or seizure in a court.
Along the same lines, § 213 of the Act allows for the execution of a
search warrant without giving notice to anyone that the search has
occurred-a so-called "sneak and peak" warrant.2 83 Once again, if a
person is unaware that her home or office has been searched, it is highly
unlikely that the search will be challenged in court.284
While not eliminating the judicial role entirely, several sections of
the Act have moved certain judicial functions into the FISA court. As
noted earlier, the eleven judges on this court were all selected by the
Chief Justice of the United States.285 Unlike the rest of the federal
judiciary, this court only meets in secret session.2 86 There is no clerk's
office and no records are docketed.28 7 This court, alone, is an exception
to our adversarial system of justice---only the government appears
before it. 288 From 1979 to 2001, the "court approved ...all but five of
more than 14,000 surveillance applications.'

289

Sixty-six percent of all

federal wiretap applications are now presented to the FISA court, rather

280. USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
281. Id. § 802(a)(4).
282. See id.§ 215.
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000) (knock and announce statute); see also United States v.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. 521 (2003) (addressing requirements imposed by the knock and announce statute
and Fourth Amendment).
284. This provision has drawn so much criticism that a recent amendment to a congressional
appropriations bill, introduced by Republican representative C. L. Otter, cuts off all funding for
"sneak and peek" warrants. The Otter amendment received broad bipartisan support, and was passed
309-118 in the House. See H. Amdt 292 to H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003).
285. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2003); see also supra note 163.
286. See id. § 1803(c) (2003).
287. See id.
288. See id. § 1802.
289. Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitutional
Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 61, at 81.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 32:795

than the courts of general jurisdiction. 290 "The number of FISA
applications per year has risen from about 200 in 1979 to nearly 1,000 in
2001 '' 291 to more than 1700 in 2003.292 The point is simple-the policy

is to avoid judicial interference whenever possible.
Even the standards to be applied by the the FISA court are being
relaxed. The USA PATRIOT Act, for example, permits the the FISA
court to authorize a pen registers293 or trap and trace devices

294

to

monitor telephonic or electronic communication based on a
"certification" by a law enforcement officer (i.e., the executive branch)
that the information sought is "related" to a law enforcement purpose,
namely the obtaining of foreign intelligence information. 295 The
government need not show probable cause, nor must it certify, as was
the former requirement, that it has reason to believe that the surveillance
is to be conducted on a line or device used to communicate with
someone involved in international terrorism or intelligence. Thus, the
government can track an American citizen's telephone and internet
usage on the mere certification that the investigation is related to foreign
intelligence or terrorism. There is a real question as to whether this new
standard meets the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
Intimidatingthe Judiciary
A third effort to neutralize the judiciary is the intimidation of
judges. In order to avoid the risk of close judicial review, recent
legislation and comments by some members of Congress seem designed
to intimidate judges. If successful, there is a risk that judges will merely
rubber-stamp the actions of the political branches to avoid confrontation.
Although the intimidation efforts are not all directed to terrorism-related
cases, they collectively create an atmosphere of mistrust and bullying
designed to encourage the judiciary to decide cases in the way that the
political branches want them to be decided.

290. See Ann Beeson, On the Home Front: A Lawyer's Struggle to Defend Rights After 9/11, in
THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 61, at 300.
291. Id.at300-01.
292. See FBI Said Buried by Security Demands, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, available at

http://www.washingtontimes.com.
293. A pen register records the number dialed on outgoing calls. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
(2004).

294. A trap and trace device records the telephone number of incoming calls. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127(4).
295. See USA PATRIOT Act § 214.
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On April 10, 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today ("PROTECT")
Act.296 Although the Act's name seems to suggest it is addressed only to
crimes against children, an amendment to the PROTECT Act limits
judicial discretion in sentencing in all cases. 297 The Act explicitly
eliminates the power of judges to depart below the sentence range
proscribed in the United States Sentencing Guidelines for certain types
of crimes.298 In addition, the Act directs the United States Sentencing
Commission to amend the Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements
"to ensure that the incidence [sic] of downward departures [from the
applicable Guideline range] are substantially reduced." 299 The Act
further requires that when reviewing a district court's decision to impose
a sentence below the Guideline range, the appellate court conduct a de
novo review of that decision to depart.300 Prior to the Act, the sentencing
judge's decision was reviewed for abuse of discretion, a highly
deferential standard.3 ' The PROTECT Act now limits the number of
judges who may serve on the Sentencing Commission to three (i.e. a
minority of the seven member Commission), whereas prior to the
amendment "at least three" of the Commissioners were required to be
judges, thereby virtually ensuring that judges constituted the majority of
the Commission.30 2
While these actions evince a deep distrust of the judiciary's
exercise of discretion, they are perhaps not the worst of it. The Act
requires the Attorney General to submit a report to Congress, within
fifteen days of a court's grant of a downward departure, containing the
name of the district judge who departed and the stated reason for the
downward departure. 30 3 All judges who impose a sentence outside of the

296. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
297. See generally id. § 401.
298. See id. § 401(a)(2).
299. Id. § 401(m)(2)(A).
300. In a recent decision, UnitedStates v. Thurston, 338 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2003), supersededby
358 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2003), an appellate court reversed a district court's downward departure based
on the defendant's extraordinary charitable acts applying the new standard of de novo review. See
id. at 60-72. On remand, rather than impose the sentence mandated by the Court of Appeals, the
district judge recused himself. See United States v. Thurston, 286 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D. Mass.
2003).
301. This deferential standard was explicitly approved by the United States Supreme Court in
its unanimous decision in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
302. See PROTECT Act § 401(n).
303. Seeid. § 401(1).
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Guidelines range are "reported" to the executive (i.e., Department of
Justice) and then the legislative (i.e., Congress) branches.3 °4
The judiciary's reaction to the PROTECT Act has been swift. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist noted, in a speech to the Board of Directors
of the Federal Judges Association, that "[t]here can ... be no doubt that

the subject matter [of the Attorney General's Report], and whether [it]
target[s] the judicial decisions of individual federal judges, could
amount to an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to 30 5intimidate
individualjudges in the performance of theirjudicialduties.
Former Judge John Martin of the Southern District of New York
wrote in a New York Times op-ed, "[f]or a judge to be deprived of the
ability to consider all of the factors that go into formulating a just
sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that has
been a hallmark of the American system of justice. 30 6 In a recent
opinion, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, Chief Judge of the Northern District
of California, wrote "the wisdom of the years and breadth of experience
accumulated by judges and the Sentencing Commission in adjudicating
criminal cases and sentencing defendants is shucked for the inexperience
of young prosecutors and the equally young think-tank policy makers in
the legislative and executive branches. 30 7
Relatedly, on July 28, 2003, the Attorney General issued a directive
amending a section of the United States Attorneys' Manual to require
that U.S. Attorneys report all "downward departure" sentencing
decisions.30 8 The effect of this change will be to shift the decision of
whether to appeal a departure to the Department of Justice and away
from the field offices. When he learned of this memorandum, Senator
Edward Kennedy accused the Attorney General of engaging in an
"ongoing attack on judicial independence" and requiring federal
prosecutors "'to participate in the establishment of a blacklist of judges
who impose lesser
sentences than those recommended by the sentencing
30 9
guidelines."

304.

See id.

305.

William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Meeting of the Federal Judges Association Board
of
Directors
(May
5,
2003)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html; see also Anne Gearan,
Rehnquist Warns on Cataloging Sentencing, A.P. ONLINE, May 5, 2003.
306. John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.

307.
2003).

United States v. Mellert, No. CR 03-0043, 2003 WL 220252007, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30,

308. See Edward Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Orders Tally of Lighter Sentences-Critics
Say He Wants 'Blacklist' of Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at Al.

309. Id. (quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
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Finally, in the most troubling move of all, in late July 2003, certain
Congressmen "announced a new task force to scour the output of federal
judges for evidence of what they call 'judicial abuse."', 310 "Violatorsjudges who legislate from the bench, as the task force sees it-will
suffer exposure, public pressure and denunciation, and may be called
before Congress to explain themselves." 311 Example of judicial activism
cited by the new task force were the Supreme Court's decision that
struck down a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy,312 a NinthCircuit
decision holding that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
violates the Establishment clause of the First Amendment,313 and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision legalizing gay
marriages.314 According to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, "[w]e in
the House are putting America's judges on alert: We are watching
you." 315 Representative Ron Lewis even introduced the so-called
"Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004,"
which would permit Congress to overrule the Supreme Court "to the
extent that [the Court's] judgment concerns the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress" by two-third vote. 31 6 Ironically, Representative Lewis
suggested that his proposal was3 17"designed to preserve equal dignity
among branches of government.,

We have examined these legislative and executive actions, and the
comments of certain legislators, for a good reason. We began this Article
by framing our question in terms of the standard by which a judge
should review the propriety of governmental action taken in wartime.
The distrust of the judiciary, as demonstrated by the actions we describe,
makes it difficult for judges to do their jobs. Judges are only human, and
decisions that could arguably affect the safety of the nation are among
the most difficult to make. Whatever the standard of review should be, it
is surely something more than absolute obeisance. But it is difficult not
to be intimidated when threatened with public exposure and
denunciation.
310.

Todd J. Gillman, GOP Group Plans to Turn up Scrutiny on Federal Judges, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2003, at 1 (quoting Congressman Lamar Smith); Judiciary Under Attack,
THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2003, at 3.

311. See Gillman, supranote 310 (emphasis added).
312. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
313. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. grantedsub nom. Elk
Grove United School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 384 (2003).
314. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 941 (Mass. 2003).
315. Gillman, supra note 310.
316. H.R. 3920, 108th Cong. § 2(2) (2004).
317. Press Release, Accountability for Judicial Activism Act Introduced in House (Mar. 9,
2004), at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ky02_lewis/Activism.html.
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Conclusion
We return, finally, to the concept of judicial responsibility. A judge
has a sworn duty to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 318 This obligation does not disappear or shrink in
difficult times. Short of a truly military decision (e.g., those made on the
battlefield), which are not within the purview of the courts, the judiciary
must continue in its traditional role of reviewing the decisions of the
political branches to ensure that they adhere to the spirit and letter of the
Constitution. While the issues raised in cases dealing with the War on
Terrorism are not easy-because by definition they call into question
actions the government believes are necessary to protect the homelandjudges must not shrink from their vital role.
Though a cliche, the saying "if we lose our liberties fighting this
war, the terrorists will have won," comes close to being true. If we
abandon the rule of law, the terrorists may not have won, but we surely
have lost. More elegantly stated, "[t]errorism does not justify the neglect
of accepted legal norms. This is how we distinguish ourselves from the
terrorists themselves. 3 19 Our review of the case law reveals that the
judiciary has not always faithfully defended the Constitution and has
often recognized that failure with regret, after the crisis has passed. This
time, we hope that the judiciary will not fail.

318. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
319. Aharon Barak, Forward.- a Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 151 (2002).
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